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INTRODUCTION 
A few years after the enactment and the implementation in the Member States of 
the European Union of the most comprehensive directive for the harmonization of 
national copyright laws in the so-called “Information Society”, the European 
Commission started reviewing how copyright and related rights were being 
commercially exploited in the digital environment.1 
Unsurprisingly, in 2005 the Commission eventually realized that copyright 
management gave rise to licensing practices that segmented the so-called “Internal 
Market” on a strictly in-territorial basis, in spite of the borderless nature of Web-
based environments.2  From then onwards, the Commission has been in search of 
solutions to tackle economic inefficiencies stemming from territorial restrictions in 
copyright management and to eventually boost the growth of legitimate online 
content services, starting with music services. 
Anyone that has the opportunity to access online music or film services in both 
the United States and in Europe (or even in distinct E.U. countries) can easily 
realize how undeveloped, or more restricted territorially, the E.U. online content 
sector is.  In the United States, the recent launch of innovative online services—
e.g., Apple’s iTunes, Microsoft’s Zune, Rhapsody, Beatport, Pandora—has 
revolutionized the landscape of legitimate access to and use of online content and 
created a credible alternative to digital piracy.  Contrastingly, in the European 
 
 *  Assistant Professor of Intellectual Property Law, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, 
Denmark; Visiting Scholar (2010/2011), Columbia Law School.  Thanks to Jane Ginsburg, Adriana 
Moscoso del Prado, Violaine Dehin, Evangelia Psychogiopoulou, Maria Moustakali, Andrea Wechsler, 
Josef Drexl, Sylvie Nérisson, Tobias Bednarz, Felix Stang and the editors of the Columbia Journal of 
Law and the Arts for their useful comments and criticism.  All opinions and inaccuracies contained in 
this Article are the author’s sole responsibility. 
 1. See Council Directive 2001/29, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC) [hereinafter Council Directive 
2001/29]. 
 2. See Commission Study on a Community Initiative on the Cross-border Collective 
Management of Copyright (July 7, 2005), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/study-collectivemgmt_en.pdf 
[hereinafter Commission Study of July 7, 2005]. 
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Union, online music services and music stores—e.g., LastFm, Spotify, iTunes—
have not taken off, at least not fully.  This is not only due to the still rampant 
phenomenon of music and film piracy on illegal file sharing platforms.  The 
unbearable complexity of online rights clearance processes is a major problem for 
commercial users wishing to develop and launch pan-European online content 
services and to take advantage of the E.U. cultural sector as a whole.3 
From a technical and infrastructural point of view, Europe seems to be ready to 
let online markets develop and flourish: broadband Internet access services and 
mobile communications are growing at a very fast pace and are increasingly 
widespread across the European Union.  Nearly half of European citizens use the 
Internet every day and a significant percentage of the E.U. population has 
broadband access online subscriptions.4 
This Article focuses on the main reasons that still make online rights clearance 
processes very complex and economically unsustainable on a pan-European scale.  
In particular, the Article examines the restructuring of online rights management 
that the E.U. Commission recently imposed upon collecting societies and copyright 
holders in the online music sector in order to foster the adoption of multiterritorial 
collective licenses covering the whole territory of the European Union.5. 
The Article examines the responses of major international music publishers and 
national collecting societies to the European Commission’s action by focusing on 
the emergence of distinct types of new licensing models and on the legal problems 
and questions that these new models have posed so far.6  In particular, it is 
emphasized that the reform advocated by the E.U. Commission paved the way not 
only for effective competition between different collective rights managers at the 
European level, but also (and most importantly) for a completely new form of 
competition among distinct music repertoires, which are now offered to 
commercial users by separate licensing bodies under their own contractual 
conditions and at their own prices. 
 
 3. See DG INFSO & DG MARKT, Creative Content in a European Digital Single Market:  
Challenges for the Future, at 2 (Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/ 
other_actions/col_2009/reflection_paper.pdf [hereinafter Creative Content] (estimating that the EU 
cultural sector—which includes published content such as books, newspapers and magazines, as well as 
sound recordings, films, videos on demand and videogames—generates in Europe a yearly turnover of 
650 billion euros, contributing to 2.6 percent of the European Union's GDP and employing more than 
three percent of the E.U. work force). 
 4. See Commc’n Comm., Broadband Access in the EU:  Situation at 1 July 2009, at 4, 6, COM 
(2009) 29 final (Nov. 18, 2009) (positing that subscriptions to broadband Internet access has continued 
across the continent in the last years, even if big divides remain).  Until July 2009, twenty-four percent 
of the E.U. population had broadband access online subscriptions.  Id.  Even mobile broadband has been 
growing quickly, with a significant fifty-four percent increase between January and July 2009 and a 
penetration rate of 4.2 percent reported in July of the same year.  Id.  In spite of that, in 2010 digital 
music revenues accounted for less than twenty percent of labels’ trade revenues in Europe.  IFPI, IFPI 
DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2011:  MUSIC AT THE TOUCH OF A BUTTON 14 (2011), available at http:// 
www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2011.pdf.  In the same year, instead, the United States was the largest 
digital music market in the world, where digital channels accounted for almost half of record companies’ 
trade revenues. Id. 
 5. See infra Sections I and II. 
 6. See infra Section III. 
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My analysis is mainly intended to shed light on the most important 
consequences that the E.U.-wide “monorepertoire” licensing models recently 
developed by major international music publishers have had thus far.  The 
emergence of these new actors has inevitably altered the music licensing structure 
by weakening the role of small and medium size collecting societies, which can no 
longer manage digital uses of the most commercially successful international music 
repertoire (i.e., the Anglo-American repertoire) in their jurisdictions as they did 
before on the grounds of a well established network of reciprocal representation 
agreements built up by collecting societies at the international level.  In particular, 
the Article suggests that the new monorepertoire model for the E.U.-wide 
management of authors’ and music publishers’ rights is designed mostly to 
facilitate a vertically integrated and (almost) independent management of all online 
music rights, which include the neighboring rights of record producers and 
performing artists.7 
The scenarios which have materialized in the wake of the restructuring of online 
music rights management show how the pan-European monorepertoire licensing 
models of the major multinational music groups impacts the economic 
sustainability of national collecting societies and the online rights clearance 
solutions made available to commercial  users.8  The Article also examines whether 
the above restructuring is of any help to rights holders and rights managers who 
find it suitable or commercially convenient to combine commercial collective 
licenses and noncommercial individual licenses (e.g., Creative Commons) in the 
management of online rights over their works. 
In conclusion, I argue that the radical modification of the structure of online 
music rights management recently pursued by the E.U. Commission has mainly 
failed its policy objectives while making online music rights clearance even more 
complicated, legally uncertain and discouraging.9  The Article also indicates what 
legislative amendments the Commission might consider proposing in order to 
rationalize and greatly simplify collective rights management in the digital 
environment and what the easiest and most productive model for the development 
of E.U.-wide music rights management could be. 
I.  ONLINE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS IN THE E.U. COPYRIGHT SYSTEM: 
PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
Politically speaking, E.U. law has a long way to go before it can establish a 
single copyright system which—in principle—would be the best way to establish a 
truly common (i.e., unique) market for copyright based goods and services.  
Philosophical and cultural diversities are widely mirrored in the intrinsic 
differences that exist between the U.K. and U.S. notions of copyright and the 
continental European notion of author’s right (droit d’auteur).10 
 
 7. See infra Section IV. 
 8. See infra Section V. 
 9. See infra Section VI. 
 10. See generally ALAIN STROWEL, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET COPYRIGHT (1993); Jane C. Ginsburg, 
MAZZIOTTI Final 12/5/2011  8:55 PM 
760 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [34:4 
These differences still matter and raise complex issues because collecting 
societies have developed different models and rules for the transfer and the 
management of the Anglo-American and the continental-European music 
repertoires.11 
As things stand, an online service provider or a digital music retailer wishing to 
use music works for its online or mobile exploitations needs to clear two categories 
of rights conferred to authors (i.e., composers and lyricists) under copyright laws: 
mechanical (reproduction) and public performance rights.12 
The advent of digital technologies has increasingly blurred the distinction 
between these two categories that, in the offline world, to the contrary, address 
wholly separate types of activities.  Even if the category of “online” rights already 
exists on the market and in the day-to-day practice of collecting societies, the 
category has not been legally codified yet.13  This circumstance stems mainly from 
the decision of the drafters of the 2001 Information Society directive not to create a 
new type of right and to extend the scope of the pre-existing rights of reproduction 
and communication to the public in order to cover online exploitations.14 
Unfortunately, the definition of the exclusive right of the author to make her 
protected works available interactively (i.e., the right of making works available “in 
such a way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them”) was provided without any further clarification about 
whether the clearance of such a right would have sufficed to clear online on-
 
A Tale of Two Copyrights:  Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, in OF AUTHORS 
AND ORIGINS:  ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994). 
 11. For the purpose of this Article, the notion “Anglo-American repertoire” broadly refers to 
music works registered with the collecting societies of the United Kingdom and of the Unites States, 
irrespective of the nationality of the authors and of the language of the lyrics of songs or other kinds of 
vocal works.  The Article often compares this notion to that of the “continental-European repertoire,” 
which broadly refers to music works registered with the collecting societies of countries such as Italy, 
Spain, France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands.  See Case 4404, Universal/BMG Music 
Publishing, Eur. Comm’n Competition, at 10, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/ 
cases/decisions/m4404_20070522_20600_en.pdf [hereinafter Universal/BMG Music Publ’g Decision] 
(relying upon this distinction in the analysis of the music market in Europe for the purpose of a merger 
review). 
 12. See id. at 6 (arguing that online rights constitute a specific combination of mechanical and 
performance rights for online applications, such as music downloading services). 
 13. See Universal/BMG Music Publ’g Decision, supra note 11, at 7 (defining online rights as 
applying to a wide range of online and mobile applications, all of which require a license combining 
both mechanical and performance rights:  online (audio) download, online (audio and video) streaming, 
mobile (audio) download, mobile (audio and video) streaming, ringtones, mastertones and 
ringbacktones). 
 14. See Commission Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, at 
17, COM (1995) 382 final (July 19, 1995).  The Green Paper argues: 
The class of existing rights was felt to be adequate, both to permit new exploitation and to 
maintain satisfactory protection for the right-holders.  However, it was underlined that certain 
concepts were going to move in new realms and that it would be necessary to "adjust" them as a 
result.  The rights of reproduction, communication to the public and rental were all suggested to 
be likely to take on new characteristics. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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demand exploitations.15  Since acts of reproductions are a technical necessity for 
whatever form of digital content transmission, the holders of mechanical rights for 
music works have managed to enforce their digital reproduction rights by 
successfully claiming the clearance of such rights in order to make any on-demand 
transmission of copyrighted works legitimate. 
Almost insurmountable problems in the clearance of online rights have stemmed 
from the fact that collecting societies have traditionally organized their work by 
clearly keeping acts of reproduction and communication to the public distinct, and 
by developing different rules and practices for the transfer and management of the 
respective exclusive rights.16 
Consequently, the two above mentioned categories of rights are often held by 
distinct (and sometimes multiple) rights holders.  This is true especially for music 
works whose ownership was defined and split contractually between the author and 
the publisher before the advent of the digital environment.  The result of old-
fashioned copyright ownership regimes is that E.U. collecting societies, which 
represent both authors and music publishers, continue to rely on different 
categories of rights in today’s online rights management.17  The distinction is also 
mirrored in the different shares that collective societies reserve to holders of 
reproduction and public performance rights by distributing revenues coming from 
online and mobile music services.18 
II.  THE RESTRUCTURING OF ONLINE MUSIC RIGHTS 
MANAGEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
In the last few years, the European Commission advocated a structural change in 
the collective management of online music rights and in the relationship between 
rights holders and collecting societies based in the European Union.  Before 
reviewing the new licensing models which have emerged as a result of such 
change, it is necessary to briefly review the legal sources which caused the above 
 
 15. See Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 1, art. 3.2. 
 16. In countries like the United Kingdom, for example, the distinction between mechanical and 
performing rights was even reflected in the creation and operation of two distinct collecting societies, 
i.e., the Mechanical Copyright Protection Society (“MCPS”) and the Performing Right Society (“PRS”).  
In the United States, the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”), 
Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”) and SESAC, Inc., are entitled to manage only the so-called “small” 
rights of public performance over musical compositions (i.e., the nondramatic performance of 
nondramatic music).  The “grand” (i.e., dramatic) rights of public performance and the reproduction 
rights, instead, are licensed by copyright holders on an individual basis.  See JANE C. GINSBURG & 
ROBERT A. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT:  CASES AND MATERIALS 678–79 (7th ed. 2006). 
 17. See Violaine Dehin, The Future of Legal Online Music Services in the European Union:  A 
Review of the EU Commission’s Recent Initiatives in Cross-Border Copyright Management, 32 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 220, 211 (2010) (positing that collecting societies have created, in parallel to legal 
definitions, different categories of rights (known as “GEMA categories”), each of which refers to a 
specific form of exploitation of music works and to the conditions under which the permission for such 
exploitation is granted). 
 18. For instance, music downloads are widely assimilated to reproduction based services whereas 
music streaming transmissions are viewed as performance based services. 
MAZZIOTTI Final 12/5/2011  8:55 PM 
762 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [34:4 
mentioned major change and the most relevant measures undertaken by the 
European Commission from 2004 onwards. 
A.  THE 2005 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 
In 2004, the European Commission started focusing on crucial aspects of cross-
border collective management that were neglected and underestimated by the 
drafters of Council Directive 2001/29.19  Even if its main objective was to facilitate 
the creation of a European Internal Market in the businesses enabled by new 
technologies, the 2001 directive turned out to be mostly an instrument of industrial 
policy aimed at strengthening national copyright protection and adapting it to the 
digital character of copyright’s subject matter. 
In its 2004 Communication on The Management of Copyright and Related 
Rights in the Internal Market, the Commission disclosed its objective of fostering 
the E.U.-wide licensing of certain rights concerning activities with a cross-border 
reach.20  The Commission displayed uncertainty concerning the most appropriate 
legal measure to be adopted to achieve this goal.  In particular, there were 
discussions about whether E.U. institutions should have intervened by mandating 
collecting societies to issue E.U.-wide licenses or by simply focusing on good 
governance rules for the functioning of the same entities and their modalities of 
collective management instead.  A year later, the Commission decided to accelerate 
the pursuit of its objective with specific regard to the recently emerged market for 
online music services.  Indeed, the release of a Commission Staff Working 
Document on the cross-border licensing of online copyrighted music in July 2005 
preceded the adoption of the Recommendation of October 18, 2005.21 
The main objective of the recommendation was that of establishing a 
multiterritorial licensing policy corresponding to the ubiquity of the online 
environment, to the benefit of new commercial users, such as online music service 
providers.22  The recommendation departed from the assumption that licensing of 
the exclusive rights covering online exploitations (i.e., the reproduction and 
communication to the public rights) was often restricted by territory, in such a way 
that commercial users were forced to negotiate in each member state with each of 
the respective collective rights management organizations.23 
Before adopting its Recommendation of October 18, 2005, the Commission had 
the opportunity to take into consideration (and to review from an antitrust 
perspective) the rights clearance solutions that collecting societies had developed in 
the meantime, within the legal context of their “reciprocal representation 
 
 19. See Communication from the Commission, The Management of Copyright and Related Rights 
in the Internal Market, at 9, COM (2004) 261 final (Apr. 16, 2004). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Commission Recommendation of 18 October 2005 on Collective Cross-Border Management 
of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services, 2005 O.J. (L 276) 54, 55 
[hereinafter Recommendation of Oct. 18, 2005]; Commission Study of July 7, 2005, supra note 2, at 5. 
 22. Recommendation of Oct. 18, 2005, supra note 21, at 54. 
 23. Id. 
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agreements,” negotiated and signed under the shield of umbrella associations such 
as the International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers 
(“CISAC”) and Bureau International des Sociétés Gérant les Droits 
d’Enregistrement et de Reproduction Mécanique (“BIEM”). 
In order to respond to technological advances and to provide commercial users 
with workable multiterritorial licensing solutions for Web based exploitations of 
music works, collecting societies had developed two standard (or model) 
agreements amending their pre-existing agreements and including the management 
of the rights of online public performance (Santiago Agreement) and of digital 
reproduction (Barcelona Agreement) into their scope.24 
Reciprocal representation agreements are crucially important in order to 
understand the traditional architecture of copyright collective management at the 
international level.  These agreements have traditionally allowed national collecting 
societies to administer in their territories the repertoires of the affiliated, foreign 
collecting societies that participated in the agreements, as well as administering 
their own national repertoires.25  Through a complex network of bilateral 
agreements implementing model agreements developed under the aegis of CISAC 
and BIEM, every society acquires the right to represent the worldwide music 
repertoire into its territory of operation. 
In short, the Santiago and Barcelona agreements sought to enable commercial 
users to obtain a license for online exploitations (e.g., webcasting, streaming and 
online music on demand) of the worldwide music repertoire from their national 
collecting society. By obliging users to resort to the collecting society of their 
country of residence, both agreements implemented a clause of “economic 
residence” (or “customer allocation”) that all European collecting societies received 
very well, but that raised, at the same time, the criticism of the European 
Commission.26 
In 2004, after having started antitrust proceedings in response to the notification 
of the Santiago Agreement, the Commission issued a statement of objections that 
 
 24. See Maria M. Frabboni, Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights:  
Achievements and Problems of Institutional Efforts Towards Harmonisation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON THE FUTURE OF EU COPYRIGHT 373, 382–84 (Estelle Derclaye ed., 2009); Tanya Woods, Multi-
Territorial Licensing and the Evolving Role of Collective Management Organizations, in COLLECTIVE 
MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 105, 115–18 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2d ed. 2010).  
The Santiago Agreement was signed by five collective rights management organizations which 
developed the agreement after having negotiated unsuccessfully, with other CISAC members, a major 
adjustment of the CISAC Model Contract.  Id.  The five organizations were:  BMI (United States), 
BUMA (Netherlands), GEMA (Germany), PRS (UK) and SACEM (France).  Id.  The Barcelona 
Agreement, instead, was a standard bilateral agreement concluded in 2002 by the members of the BIEM, 
i.e., the umbrella organization representing and coordinating the activities of mechanical rights 
collecting societies.  Id.  This standard agreement was conceived as an amendment of the pre-existing 
reciprocal representation agreements concluded by the BIEM members.  Id. 
 25. In the traditional system of managing copyright and related rights, if copyrighted works 
registered with a collecting society active in country A are accessible in country B, the society active in 
country B normally enters into a reciprocal representation agreement with the society active in country 
A, which holds the repertoire on behalf of the copyright holder. 
 26. See Frabboni, supra note 24, at 383–84; Woods, supra note 24, at 117. 
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was a kind of death sentence for single multiterritorial licenses granting access to 
the global music repertoire for online exploitations.27  In particular, the 
Commission found that the above mentioned clauses of economic residence were 
anticompetitive because, in contrast to former EC Treaty art. 81 (today’s Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, hereinafter TFEU, art. 101), they made it 
impossible for the users to obtain a license from a society of their choice.28  The 
Commission eventually found that this prevented the market from evolving in 
different directions and preserved the territorial exclusivity enjoyed by each of the 
participating societies.29  Both agreements were not renewed and were no longer in 
force when the recommendation was adopted (the Santiago Agreement expired in 
2004). 
The 2005 recommendation relied upon the fact that the Santiago and Barcelona 
agreements were not renewed by European collecting societies.  The 
recommendation drew on the assumption that reciprocal representation agreements 
(in their pre-Santiago and pre-Barcelona versions) gave rise to territorial 
restrictions in the administration of the rights involved in the online exploitation of 
copyrighted music. 
Generally speaking, the nonbinding recommendation advocated multiterritorial 
licensing by urging E.U. member states to grant copyright holders the right to 
assign the management of online rights, on a territorial scope of their choice, to a 
collecting society of their choice, irrespectively of nationality and residence 
considerations.30  To this end, member states were invited to screen their national 
legislation in order to prohibit all territorial restrictions created by reciprocal 
representation agreements and membership contracts that ultimately restricted each 
collecting society from managing online rights for the whole territory of the 
European Union, regardless of the residence of the authors and regardless of the 
economic location of the commercial users. 
In addition to that, the recommendation established a set of recommended 
practices with a view to enhancing the degree of efficiency and transparency of 
collecting societies and enabling effective competition among them.31  Such 
practices concerned crucial aspects such as equitable royalty collection and 
distribution without discrimination on the grounds of residence, nationality or 
 
 27. See Commission Notice Published Pursuant to Article 27(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 
1/2003 in Cases COMP/C2/39152—BUMA and COMP/C2/39151 SABAM (Santiago Agreement—
COMP/C2/38126), 2005 O.J. (C 200) 11 [hereinafter Commission Notice on the Santiago Agreement]. 
 28. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101, Sep. 5 
2008, 2008 O.J. (C115) 47, 88 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 29. See Commission Notice on the Santiago Agreement, supra note 27, at 11. 
 30. See Recommendation of Oct. 18, 2005, supra note 21, at 54.  See also Commission Study of 
July 7, 2005, supra note 2, at 28.  The Commission Study clarified the legal basis for the proposed E.U. 
action: 
The EU’s mandate to act results from the fact that collective rights management services are provided 
(1) cross-border, (2) to nationals of other Member States; (3) under reciprocal representation agreements 
which contain restrictions which limit the provision of these services, inter alia: (i) by territory; (ii) by 
nationality; (iii) by Member State of economic residence.  Id. 
 31. See Recommendation of Oct. 18, 2005, supra note 21, at 54. 
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category of right holder; increased collective rights managers’ accountability; fair 
rights holders’ representation in the collective rights managers’ internal decision-
making; and effective dispute resolution procedures. 
In conclusion, the recommendation made it clear that rights holders should enjoy 
the right to withdraw any of their online rights from their current collecting society 
and to transfer such rights to another collective rights management entity of their 
choice.32 
B.  THE E.U. PARLIAMENT REACTION 
It was inevitable that the recourse to a soft law instrument for such a sensitive 
and delicate matter raised a strong conflict with the European Parliament, which 
openly criticized the adoption of the recommendation without its prior consultation 
and formal involvement.  Even if the Parliament acknowledged that copyright 
holders should in principle be free to choose a collecting society for the 
management of their rights, it expressed concern about the risks of rights 
concentration in the hands of the biggest collecting societies that the 
recommendation entailed, to the detriment of local and niche repertoires. 
In a resolution in 2007 following the release of an official report on the 2005 
recommendation, the Parliament argued that a fair and transparent competitive 
system among national collecting societies could have been created through a 
flexible framework directive, which could have regulated copyright collective 
management for cross-border online music services.33  Through this proposal to the 
Commission, the Parliament made it clear that urging national collecting societies 
to compete with one another without having harmonized their highly heterogeneous 
legal status, institutional mission and services would not have been fair.  This 
would have inevitably endangered the economic sustainability of those societies 
that, according to their national laws, not only try to maximize licensing revenues 
(acting as pure copyright holders’ agents), but also pursue cultural goals and a 
certain degree of solidarity among their members.34 
Despite these observations and criticism, the Commission took the view that a 
“wait and see” approach would have been more beneficial than regulation in a fast-
developing environment.  A more cautious approach, it was said, would have 
allowed the Commission to observe how markets develop and what online 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. European Parliament Resolution of 13 March 2007 on the Commission Recommendation of 
18 October 2005 on Collective Cross-Border Management of Copyright and Related Rights for 
Legitimate Online Music Services, 2007 O.J. (C 301E) (EC), 64, 67.  See also Resolution of 25 
September 2008 on Collective Cross-Border Management of Copyright and Related Rights for 
Legitimate Online Music Services, EUR. PARL. DOC. (2008), available at http:// 
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-
0462+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
 34. See HELLENIC FOUND. FOR EUR. & FOREIGN POL’Y, COLLECTING SOCIETIES AND CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY IN THE MUSIC SECTOR 17–18 (2009) [hereinafter ELIAMEP STUDY]; Dehin, supra note 17, 
at 222–23. 
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licensing trends eventually emerge.35 
C.  THE CISAC DECISION AND ITS IMPACT ON RECIPROCAL REPRESENTATION 
AGREEMENTS 
The European Commission’s measures in the field of music rights management 
were the result of two principal institutional actors.  Whereas Directorate General 
(“DG”) Internal Market and Services carried out the work that led to the adoption 
of the 2005 Recommendation, DG Competition dealt with antitrust investigations 
initiated in response to complaints targeting the territorial fragmentation of online 
music services and the absence of pan-European licenses.36  In particular, DG 
Competition examined two complaints in this field. 
In April 2007, the DG Competition started an investigation in response to 
consumers’ associations which complained against the territorial segmentation of 
the iTunes platform and about the impossibility for U.K. consumers to purchase 
music downloads in foreign online stores, where prices were lower.  A statement of 
objections was sent to Apple and to the major record companies operating in 
Europe, alleging that distribution agreements between Apple and each record 
company contained territorial sales restrictions which violated TFEU article 101 
(former EC Treaty article 81).37  In this case, DG Competition sought to ascertain 
whether agreements that imposed on a platform operator such as Apple a condition 
restricting downloads distribution to consumers who resided in licensed countries 
could be deemed incompatible with the common market.  According to the 
Commission, the outcome of these agreements was the restriction of the consumer 
choice of where to buy digital music, what music to buy and at what price.  As a 
result, these agreements could have been meant as restrictive business practices that 
TFEU article 101 prohibited and declared void.  Nonetheless, this investigation was 
put to an end very quickly in March 2008 since the Commission welcomed Apple’s 
decision to equalize its download prices in Europe.38 
A second and much longer and more complex investigation was launched in 
response to complaints coming from leading broadcaster RTL Group and digital 
and interactive audio broadcaster Music Choice, which targeted the absence of 
licenses for the exploitation of music works on a multiterritorial basis.  These 
complaints gave rise to a Commission decision in July 2008 that assessed the 
 
 35. See Commission Report on Monitoring the 2005 Online Music Recommendation, at 3, 8 (Feb. 
7, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/monitoring-
report_en.pdf. 
 36. Departments (Directorates-General) and Services, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/about/ 
ds_en.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2011) (providing a detailed description of the E.U. Commission’s 
Departments (Directorates-General) and services and of their main competences). 
 37. See Memorandum from the Eur. Comm’n, Competition:  European Commission Confirms 
Sending a Statement of Objections Against Alleged Territorial Restrictions in On-Line Music Sales to 
Major Record Companies and Apple,. (Apr. 3, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/126&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLangu
age=en. 
 38. Dehin, supra note 17, at 232. 
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compatibility of the system of reciprocal representation agreements between 
European collecting societies with E.U. competition law.39 
Issued at a time when the music industry was changing its traditional licensing 
schemes in response to the 2005 recommendation, this decision focused in 
particular on the conditions of management and licensing of authors’ public 
performance rights by collecting societies based in the European Economic Area 
and members of the International Confederation of Societies of Authors and 
Composers (“CISAC”).  Taking a view consistent with the findings of the case law 
of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) and of an important previous Commission 
decision on the same issue, the CISAC decision did not question the practice of 
territorial delineation by means of reciprocal representation agreements itself.40  
Rather, the Commission challenged the de facto exclusivity for the licensing of the 
aggregated repertoire of collecting societies participating in the system and the 
subsequent tight partition of the market on a national basis. 
What was deemed to undermine the interests of both copyright holders and 
commercial users was the systematic foreclosure of competition stemming from 
membership restrictions and territorial exclusivity clauses contained in the bilateral 
agreements signed by European collecting societies that implemented CISAC 
standard agreements: 
 
x According to “economic residence” clauses embodied into membership 
agreements, rights holders were forced to resort to their national 
collecting society for the assignment of collective management services 
without having the chance to choose a collecting society on the grounds 
of different criteria (e.g., level of commission fees, quality of service, 
 
 39. See Commission Decision Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and 
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, at 1, 5 COM (2008) 3435 final (July 16, 2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38698/38698_4567_1.pdf [hereinafter CISAC 
Decision]. 
 40. See Joined Cases 110, 241 & 242/88, François Lucazeau v. Societé des Auteurs, 1989 E.C.R. 
2811 (in which the ECJ concluded that territorial restrictions embodied into reciprocal representation 
agreements appeared to be economically justified since the territorial segmentation was aimed at 
ensuring the physical monitoring of the licensed uses, which at that time was deemed to indispensable); 
Case 395/87, Ministère Pub. v. Jean-Louis Tournier 1989 E.C.R. 2531 (same).   See also Case 38014, 
IFPI “Simulcasting,” Eur. Comm’n Competition, 2003 O.J. (L 107) 58, 81 (EC) [hereinafter 
Simulcasting Decision].  Through the Simulcasting Decision, the E.U. Commission ordered a number of 
recording producers, represented by their professional association (IFPI), to amend the so-called 
Simulcasting Agreement with a view to enabling users established in the territory of the European 
Economic Area (“EEA”) to approach any collecting management society (established within the EEA 
territory) to negotiate and obtain a multiterritorial license for acts of simulcasting (i.e., the simultaneous 
Internet transmission of sound recordings included in broadcasts of radio and/or TV signals).  Id.  The 
Commission also found that the monitoring tasks of collecting societies in the online environment could 
easily be performed directly on the Internet.  Id.  See also Lucie Guibault & Stef Van Gompel, 
Collective Management in the European Union, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND 
RELATED RIGHTS 117, 124 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2006) (arguing that, in the Commission’s 
understanding, the traditional economic justification for collecting societies not to compete in the cross-
border provision of services no longer applied in the online environment). 
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frequency of distribution of royalties, etc.).41 
 
x As a result of territorial exclusivity clauses, collecting societies were 
prevented from offering licenses to commercial users outside their 
national territory.  In particular, article 3 of the Commission’s decision 
held that collecting societies infringed former EC Treaty article 81 
(today’s TFEU article 101) and article 53 of the EEA agreement by 
coordinating the territorial delineation of the reciprocal representation 
mandates granted to one another in a manner that licensing for online, 
satellite and cable transmissions was limited to the domestic territory of 
each collecting society.42  The Commission considered that such 
clauses restricted competition insofar as the resulting territorial 
segmentation into national monopolies for the grant of performing 
rights cemented the structure of the market, excluded other forms of 
multirepertoire licensing and confined each collecting society to 
operate only in its domestic territory, leaving no room for other means 
of organizing and competing in the management of copyright.43 
 
As a result of its investigation, the Commission ordered twenty-four European 
collecting societies to withdraw the above mentioned economic residence clauses 
and the territorial restriction clauses from their bilateral representation agreements 
and to bring concerted practices of territorial delineation to an end.44  Even if the 
clauses at stake had already been removed from the CISAC contract model of 
reciprocal representation at the time of the decision, all the addressees of the 
decision still included them in their bilateral agreements. 
The CISAC decision had a legally binding force under article 7 of Council 
Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of E.U. competition law.45  The decision 
ordered the above mentioned twenty-four EEA collecting societies to renegotiate 
all their reciprocal representation agreements regarding the management of online, 
satellite and cable transmission rights on their repertoires on a strictly bilateral 
 
 41. See CISAC Decision, supra note 39, at 39 (considering, interestingly, that this type of clause 
affected commercial users in so far as it led to an artificial fragmentation of music repertoires; the 
reasoning of the Commission on this issue followed the rationale of the 2005 recommendation, arguing 
that, in the absence of “economic residence" clauses, the repertoires managed by collecting societies 
would be more homogeneous and commercial users would foster collecting societies to compete with 
each other on the grounds of the strengths of their respective repertoires). 
 42. The European Economic Area (“EEA”) consists of all E.U. member states, plus Norway, 
Iceland and Lichtenstein. 
 43. See CISAC Decision, supra note 39, at 59. 
 44. See id. at 73–75 (including articles 1 and 4 (membership clauses) and 3 (territorial 
exclusivity). The addressees of the decision were:  AEPI (Greece), AKKA/LAA (Latvia), AKM 
(Austria), ARTISJUS (Hungary), BUMA (Netherlands), EAU (Estonia), GEMA (Germany), IMRO 
(Ireland), KODA (Denmark), LATGA-A (Lithuania), OSA (Czech Republic), PRS (UK), SABAM 
(Belgium), SACEM (France), SAZAS (Slovenia), SGAE (Spain), SIAE (Italy), SOZA (Slovakia), SPA 
(Portugal), STEF (Iceland), STIM (Sweden), TEOSTO (Finland), TONO (Norway) and ZAIKS 
(Poland).  Id. 
 45. Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 7, 2003 O.J. (L1) 1, 2 (EC). 
MAZZIOTTI Final 12/5/2011  8:55 PM 
2011] NEW LICENSING MODELS FOR ONLINE MUSIC SERVICES 769 
basis within 120 days from the notification of the decision.46 The decision also 
ordered the collecting societies to provide the Commission with copies of the 
amended bilateral agreements.47 
Unfortunately, there is no way to know what collecting societies renegotiated 
and agreed upon in their secret and confidential agreements.  Secrecy and 
confidentiality are inevitable requirements of these agreements since the CISAC 
decision outlawed the supposedly concerted and “open” methods of creation of the 
territorial delineation.  If collecting societies disclosed such information or 
continued to involve CISAC in their negotiations they would inevitably run the 
high risk of violating the orders embodied in the decision and of being sanctioned 
through antitrust fines.  This means that only the E.U. Commission and the 
contracting parties can know the independent territorial delineations of the new 
representation agreements in their entirety. 
It is of the utmost importance to recall here that twenty-two (of a total of twenty-
four) collecting societies appealed the decision before the European Court of First 
Instance and requested interim measures for the suspension of the orders the 
decision contained, all of which were dismissed by the President of the Court.48 
An action was also brought before the same court by CISAC for the annulment 
of article 3 of the decision.49  CISAC argued in support of its action that the 
inclusion of a territorial delineation clause in all of the reciprocal agreements 
concluded by CISAC members was not the product of a concerted practice to 
restrict competition.  Rather, according to CISAC, this arrangement existed because 
the collecting societies found the incorporation of territorial delineation clauses in 
their reciprocal representation to be in the interest of their members. 
As convincingly pointed out in the literature, the court procedure in this case can 
last years and, even if the final court judgment was (surprisingly) favorable to 
collecting societies, there would be no way to restore the licensing situation 
preceding the Commission decision.50 Interestingly, the Commission recently 
disclosed that the aforementioned renegotiations (that only the Commission knows 
in their entirety, as we have seen) have not yet led to a substantial change of the 
territorial scope of the licensing of the online right of public performance, which 
still has a strictly monoterritorial dimension.51 
 
 46. CISAC Decision, supra note 39, at 75 (art. 4 ¶ 2). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Case-Law—Search Form, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en 
(last updated Mar. 4, 2011) (insert the name of the collecting society of interest into the search space 
“Names of parties”) (making available all appeals brought by EEA collecting societies against the 
CISAC decision before the Court of First Instance and the subsequent proceedings, including the 
decisions on interim measures, in the CURIA database). 
 49. Case T-442/08, CISAC v. Commission, 2009 O.J. (C 82), 25, 25–26. 
 50. See Peter Gyertyanfy, Collective Management of Music Rights in Europe After the CISAC 
Decision, 41 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 59, 80–82 (2010). 
 51. See Creative Content, supra note 3, at 6.  The reflection document by DG INFSO and DG 
MARKT argues: 
as far as the public performance rights are concerned, collective rights management remains 
local.  This split between international licensing of digital reproductions and national licensing of 
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III.  THE EMERGENCE OF CUSTOMIZED COLLECTIVE 
MANAGEMENT IN THE ONLINE MUSIC SECTOR 
Both the 2005 recommendation and the 2008 CISAC decision led to the creation 
of a completely new set of rules for the collective management of online music 
rights, which obliged the Commission to constantly monitor market developments 
as well as the conduct of pre-existing and newly established collective management 
organizations.52 
The Commission’s action advocated not only competition among collecting 
societies, but also competition based on the strengths of different music repertoires 
licensed on a pan-European basis in order to reflect the ubiquity of the Internet.  
The CISAC decision, in particular, made it clear that collective management for 
online and mobile music exploitations should no longer be based on licenses 
covering the worldwide music repertoire granted on a country-by-country basis by 
national societies holding a de facto territorial exclusivity.53 
Rather, collective management of online rights should be based on a free and 
E.U.-wide market where collective rights management organizations compete with 
one another on the grounds of their services and of the appeal of their repertoires.  
Since monitoring tasks of collective rights managers in the online environment can 
easily be performed directly on the Internet (i.e., from a distance), collecting 
societies are no longer excused for not competing in the cross-border provision of 
their services and of their own repertoires. 
The E.U. Commission expected this radical change to greatly simplify and 
improve the structure of rights management by reducing transaction costs, 
increasing economies of scale to the benefit of online music service providers and 
strengthening competition and innovation at both levels of music rights 
management and commercial offers of digital music, to the benefit of copyright 
holders, commercial users and European consumers. 
As shown in the following Sections, the current situation is far from settled and 
weighty legal questions have emerged in the implementation of new 
monorepertoire licensing models. The new online licensing trends that have 
developed in the last years in response to the E.U. Commission action clearly 
 
public performances (making available) has, it is argued, led to a further complication in online 
licensing practices.  Only time will tell how collective licensing practices with respect to 
performance rights will change in the wake of the antitrust decision in International 
Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers (CISAC); legislative intervention might 
become necessary. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 52. The most important initiatives have been carried out since 2008 by DG Internal Market and 
DG Competition, which organized various public consultations and hearings in Brussels, creating Web 
based platforms where it is possible to have access to all relevant documents, studies and reports.  See 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights, EUR. COMM’N., http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
copyright/management/management_en.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2011); Online Commerce Roundtable, 
EUR. COMM’N., http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/media/online_commerce.html (last visited Mar. 
6, 2011); Public Consultation on Content Online, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/ 
other_actions/content_online/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
 53. See CISAC Decision, supra note 39, at 74–75 (art. 3). 
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reveal a model polarisation. 
A.  COLLECTIVE RIGHTS MANAGERS LICENSING MUSIC PUBLISHERS’ 
REPERTOIRES 
A first type of model was adopted by new licensing bodies that major 
international music publishers such as EMI Music Publishing and Sony/ATV 
Music Publishing appointed as agents for their repertoires at the European level.54  
Other major publishers such as Universal Music Publishing and Warner Chappell 
opted for a slightly different version of the same model, which did not imply the 
creation of new organizations but merely appointed one or more national collecting 
societies as exclusive or nonexclusive agents of the publishers’ repertoires.55 
 1.  CELAS and PAECOL 
The Centralised European Licensing and Administrative Service (“CELAS”) 
Gmbh and the Pan-European Central Online Licensing (“PAECOL”) GmbH are 
among the most relevant and complex examples of centralized rights management 
organizations managing single repertoires.56  CELAS is jointly owned by GEMA 
and PRS for Music (i.e., the collecting societies managing the rights of authors, 
composers and publishers on the German and U.K. music repertoires).  PAECOL, 
instead, is a 100 percent subsidiary of GEMA.  These two organizations have much 
in common.  Both of them were established in Germany to provide cross-border 
licensing and management services on a pan-European basis to rights holders for 
online and mobile exploitations.  Even if they were presented as nonexclusive 
agents, these organizations have licensed only the mechanical rights of EMI Music 
Publishing’s Anglo-American repertoire (CELAS) and of Sony/ATV Music 
Publishing (PAECOL) and they seem to maintain their original vocation as 
exclusive licensors of their respective repertoires.57  The EU-wide licenses offered 
by CELAS and PAECOL cover all types of online and mobile exploitations and are 
based on the country of destination principle with regard to tariffs. 
 2.  DEAL 
A similar example of monorepertoire collective management performed by a 
 
 54. See infra Section III.A.1.  For the purpose of this Article, “international major music 
publishers” are the four major international music groups holding at least seventy percent of the world 
music repertoire through their publishing agreements:  Universal Music Publishing Group, EMI Music 
Publishing, Warner Chappell and Sony/ATV Music Publishing.  See Universal/BMG Music Publ’g 
Decision, supra note 11, at 14–15 (including a recent estimate of market shares covering all publishing 
rights, which is embodied in the merger review). 
 55. See infra Section III A.2–4. 
 56. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 29–31 (containing information, much of which was 
obtained by the authors through responses to questionnaires sent via email to the two organizations’ 
management.  Details on the functioning and licensing packages of both organizations are kept 
confidential).  See generally CELAS, http://www.celas.eu (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
 57. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 30. 
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major national collecting society stemmed from an agreement signed by SACEM 
(France) and Universal Music Publishing Group (“UMPG”).58  Under such 
agreement, SACEM is authorized to grant E.U.-wide licenses for the repertoire of 
UMPG (including the French repertoire published by UMPG) covering online and 
mobile exploitations.  Even if SACEM and UMPG state that they are willing to 
cooperate with other collecting societies and other music publishers, this initiative 
(known also under the denomination of “DEAL,” i.e., Direct European 
Administration and Licensing) seems to retain its character of exclusivity. 
 3.  PEL and PEDL 
New rights management organizations such as the Pan-European Licensing 
Initiative of Latin American Repertoire (“PEL”) and the Pan-European Digital 
Licensing (“PEDL”) initiative gave rise to wider and nonexclusive business 
alliances between major music publishers and highly representative collecting 
societies.59 
The PEL initiative stemmed from a mandate conferred to SGAE (i.e., the 
collecting society representing Spanish authors, composers and music publishers) 
by major publishers Sony/ATV Music Publishing and Peer Music and Central and 
South American collecting societies for the management of their Latin American 
repertoires for E.U.-wide online and mobile exploitations. 
This initiative covers the rights for online and mobile uses owned by Sony/ATV 
Music Publishing and Peer Music (which represent the catalogue of their Latin 
American affiliates) as well as the authors, composers and publishers that are 
members of the Central and South American collecting societies participating in the 
initiative. 
With regard to Central and South American collecting societies, interestingly, 
the mandate agreement consists of an extension of the geographical scope of the 
reciprocal representation agreements these societies signed with SGAE for online 
and mobile exploitations in the whole EEA (and not just the Spanish territory). 
In the PEDL initiative, instead, the representation and management of the music 
works published by Warner Chappell is entrusted to a number of European 
collecting societies, which include PRS for Music (United Kingdom), STIM 
(Sweden), SACEM (France), SGAE (Spain) and BUMA-STEMRA 
(Netherlands).60  Collecting societies are designated as nonexclusive licensing 
agents of Warner Chappell for the mechanical rights of its Anglo-American 
 
 58. See Universal Music Publishing Group and SACEM Sign Agreement for Online Mobile 
Licensing in Europe, UNIVERSAL MUSIC (Jan. 28, 2006), http://www.universalmusic.com/corporate/ 
news35520. 
 59. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 31–33. 
 60. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 32–33; GEMA, the MCPS-PRS Alliance and STIM 
Join Warner/Chappell Music's Pan-European Digital Licensing (PEDL) Initiative, PRS FOR MUSIC, 
(Jan. 30, 2008), http://www.prsformusic.com/aboutus/press/latestpressreleases/mcpsprsalliance/Pages/ 
ThreekeycollectionsocietiesarethefirsttosignuptoPEDLinitiative.aspx (disclosing that three “key 
collection societies” were the first to join the PEDL initiative designed to facilitate the licensing of 
musical compositions for music services throughout Europe). 
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repertoire and are authorized to grant pan-European licenses for digital 
exploitations. 
Both the PEL and PEDL initiatives apply their tariffs on the grounds of the 
country of exploitation of the works licensed.  They differ remarkably, however, as 
far as their internal organization is concerned.  The PEDL organization is open in 
principle to any European collecting society wishing to join it on condition that 
each new society complies with a set of specific requirements aimed at ensuring 
transparency, efficiency and accountability.  The PEL initiative, to the contrary, is 
uniquely based on the licensing activities performed by SGAE, which receives an 
exclusive mandate from all the rights holders involved and retains a significant 
power of coordination and supervision that, so far, has facilitated the creation of an 
online database indexing all administered works and has ensured a smooth 
transition towards the implementation of E.U.-wide licenses.61 
 4.  IMPEL 
In January 2010, U.K. collecting society PRS for Music launched the 
Independent Music Publishers European Licensing (“IMPEL”) initiative, which 
plays in this initiative a managing function which is very similar to that of SGAE in 
the PEL consortium.62  The IMPEL foundation is of much interest in the new 
scenario of repertoire-based licensing models because it gives independent 
publishers the same benefits that the individual major publishers have achieved by 
licensing their mechanical rights on a multiterritorial basis through one rights 
manager. 
As far as we know, IMPEL is the only initiative enabling a number of 
independent publishers to take (some) advantage of the type of E.U.-wide licensing 
model recommended by the E.U. Commission in 2005.63  In this regard, IMPEL 
can be easily viewed as the exception that proves the rule.  As explained by PRS on 
its website, independent music publishers have appointed PRS as their agent 
through the IMPEL initiative in order to create a common one-stop shop for 
licensees of the online and mobile mechanical rights covering their (Anglo-
 
 61. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 32 (reporting the implementation plan that SGAE 
followed in order to ensure clarity in the transition from the traditional to the new E.U.-wide licensing 
model adopted under the PEL initiative:  firstly, publishers announced the withdrawal of their Latin 
American repertoire before signing the agreement with SGAE; secondly, after the entry into force of the 
agreement, SGAE sent information letters to all European collecting societies and instructed them to 
continue to collect royalties for local exploitations of Peer Music’s and SONY/ATV Music Publishing’s 
Latin American repertoire). 
 62. See What is IMPEL?, PRS FOR MUSIC, http://www.prsformusic.com/impel/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2011). 
 63. See Indy Publishers and PRS for Music Launch IMPEL, PRS FOR MUSIC (May 25, 2010), 
http://www.prsformusic.com/aboutus/press/latestpressreleases/Pages/IndypublishersandPRSforMusiclau
nchIMPEL.aspx (reporting that publishers such as Moncur Street Music Limited, RZO Music Limited, 
Truelove Music, Conexion Music, Fairwood Music (United Kingdom), Hornall Brothers Music, Kassner 
Associate Publishers, Music Sales, Proof Songs, Red Ink Music and Reverb Music signed up, and any 
right holder wishing to entrust his or her online rights has the freedom to join the platform). 
MAZZIOTTI Final 12/5/2011  8:55 PM 
774 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [34:4 
American) repertoire.64  Given that PRS already represented the associated 
performing rights on the same repertoire, IMPEL is now able to license the 
mechanical rights directly, and to license the digital performing rights indirectly.65  
B.  COLLECTIVE ONLINE RIGHTS MANAGERS LICENSING REGIONAL 
REPERTOIRES 
An opposite pan-European licensing model that has emerged recently is based 
on the regional consolidation of music repertoires achieved through the 
establishment of strategic alliances by national collecting societies in Southern and 
Northern Europe.  This approach to online music rights management can be viewed 
as a necessary response to the business models launched by the individual major 
music publishers and the very few, major collecting societies representing the most 
commercially valuable music repertoires and their copyright owners (i.e., authors 
and publishers). 
 1.  ARMONIA 
Throughout 2007 and 2008, SGAE, SACEM and SIAE (i.e., respectively, the 
Spanish, French and Italian collecting societies for authors, composers and music 
publishers) started cooperating with a view toward establishing a new licensing 
entity called ARMONIA, a joint venture for the licensing of the repertoires of these 
societies for online and mobile exploitations.66 
In 2010, the three potential founders desisted from their initial project to 
institutionalize their joint licensing branch, after having sought to solve various 
corporate and tax issues related to the establishment of their joint venture.67  These 
societies decided to transform ARMONIA into a highly coordinated undertaking 
aimed at licensing their national repertoires, as a single bundle of distinct 
repertoires, for online and mobile exploitations.  The ARMONIA project has 
recently started operating by granting E.U.-wide licenses (split formally into three 
separate bundles of licenses) for their consolidated repertoires on the grounds of the 
mandates entrusted to them by means of rights holders’ membership agreements.68  
SIAE recently explained to us that this strong coordination project has resulted so 
 
 64. Id. (promoting PRS’ initiative by claiming that its systems to process online mechanical rights 
allow both publishers and music service providers to benefit from increased transparency and faster 
transfer of payments and clearance of rights). 
 65. PRS is authorized to make the Anglo-American performing rights match the mechanical 
rights being provided by the IMPEL members.  As we will see below in more depth, this is an important 
clarification because it shows that IMPEL can manage directly just the online mechanical rights.  The 
online performing rights, instead, are (still) licensed by collecting societies like PRS, which grant such 
rights to IMPEL after having acquired them from the EEA sister societies.  Through this complex legal 
technique, IMPEL is able to provide an effective E.U.-wide one stop shop for its licensees. Id. 
 66. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 33–34. 
 67. Telephone interview with Manlio Mallia, Vice Director, SIAE (Feb. 2, 2011) (providing 
updated information about the operation of the ARMONIA initiative). 
 68. Beatport Announces First Pan-European Digital Publishing License with ARMONIA Group 
of Societies, ROYALTY WEEK (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.royaltyweek.com/?p=896. 
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far in the development and implementation of new technologies that greatly 
facilitate joint collective management for online uses such as a repertoire database 
to determine the share of each collecting society for the licensing services provided.  
The aim of the project is to offer innovative services to operators of specifically 
defined territories, in order to increase synergies, combine know-how and share 
information. 
 2.  Nordisk Copyright Bureau 
Another important initiative in the direction of regional repertoire consolidation 
in the digital environment has recently developed from a pre-existing cross-border 
licensing system established by the Baltic and Nordic collecting societies for 
analogical uses of music works. Under this system (which has been continuously 
developed since 2001), users have been free to choose from which society they 
wish to obtain the license and to pay the tariffs of the country of destination.69  
Since 2009, under the aegis of their own licensing branch, the Nordisk Copyright 
Bureau, these societies have been extending and strengthening their cooperation so 
as to transform the Bureau into a European licensing hub for mechanical and online 
licensing and for the collection and distribution of royalties beyond the territories 
within which the cross-border system previously operated (i.e., Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia).70 
The objective of the Nordisk Copyright Bureau is to transform itself from a 
regional monopoly into a market oriented body providing its services to 
international online music providers on a European scale.  To this end, the Bureau 
and the United Kingdom collecting society PRS for Music recently announced a 
new partnership to cooperate on recorded media royalty processing and ensure cost 
effectiveness and consolidation in the development of a hub for rights management 
in Europe.71 
IV.  UNSETTLED ISSUES RAISED BY NEW MONOREPERTOIRE 
RIGHTS MANAGERS 
This Section identifies the major legal issues raised by the establishment and 
operation of the new monorepertoire rights managers of music repertoires in the 
E.U. online environment.  The first Subsection explains why the withdrawals of 
online rights have been incomplete and largely unsuccessful in Europe with regard 
to both the Anglo-American and continental European repertoires.  The second 
Subsection sheds light on other questions that the existing legal framework and the 
functioning of today’s specialized rights managers leave unanswered. 
 
 69. See About NCB, NORDISK COPYRIGHT BUREAU, http://www.ncb.dk/english/00/ 
ncbvision.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
 70. NORDISK COPYRIGHT BUREAU, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT (2010). 
 71. See PRS for Music and NCB Join Forces on Recorded Music Operations, NORDISK 
COPYRIGHT BUREAU (Sep. 27, 2010), http://www.ncb.dk/pdf/2010-09-17-pressrelease.pdf. 
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A.  UNEASY WITHDRAWAL OF RIGHTS HOLDERS’ ONLINE RIGHTS IN EUROPE 
The creation and/or appointment of centralized and specialized agents at the 
E.U. level took place in conjunction with the major international music publishers’ 
withdrawals of their Anglo-American repertoires from the aggregated global 
repertoires managed by local collecting societies under their system of mutual 
representation agreements.  Unfortunately, a full withdrawal of both the exclusive 
rights covering online and mobile exploitations in Europe proved to be very hard or 
just impossible, at least for a few rights managers which recently appeared and 
started operating in the E.U. market. 
The “pro-competition” shift in the online environment from a system of 
multirepertoire licenses granted on a strictly national basis to a system of E.U.-wide 
monorepertoire licenses competing with one another presupposed a free (or at least 
smooth) transferability of both the mechanical and performing rights from rights 
holders to the new rights managers.  As admitted by the same European 
Commission while analyzing the state of the art in the online music sector in 
October 2009, online music services still remained nascent in spite of the 
establishment of new online rights managers.72  On that occasion, the Commission 
explicitly referred to these new entities as licensors of the mere digital reproduction 
(i.e., mechanical) rights, which are insufficient for the full clearance of online and 
mobile exploitations.73 
The Creative Content document confirmed that, whilst reproduction rights were 
already licensed on an E.U.-wide basis, the management of public performance 
rights remained local and this inevitably led to a further complication in online 
licensing practices, even in the wake of the CISAC decision.74  With this laconic 
statement, the Commission implicitly acknowledged that the strictly bilateral (and 
secret) renegotiations of the European collecting societies’ reciprocal representation 
agreements ordered by the CISAC decision had not yet enabled the grant of 
multiterritorial (possibly E.U.-wide) licenses of the (necessary) public performance 
rights over online music transmissions.75 
The Commission failed to include in the Creative Content document of 
November 2009 what it widely understood and disclosed in its review of the effects 
on the E.U. market of the acquisition of BMG by Universal Music Publishing in 
May 2007.76  The Commission was fully aware of the fact that the unfortunate 
consequence of separate licensing of mechanical and public performance rights was 
somehow inevitable in the absence of uniform laws and common contractual 
practices for the definition of copyright ownership regimes at the national level.  In 
fact, contractual practices and arrangements that the national collecting societies 
developed in order to protect their authors (i.e., composers and lyricists) in their 
 
 72. See Creative Content, supra note 3, at 6 (explicitly mentioning initiatives such as CELAS, 
PEDL, ARMONIA and DEAL).. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See supra Section II.C. 
 76. See Universal/BMG Music Publ’g Decision, supra note 11. 
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bargain with music publishers heavily hindered the progressive implementation of 
E.U.-wide monorepertoire licenses.  This situation occurred because the full 
withdrawal and transfer of mechanical and public performance rights over music 
works from traditional collecting societies to new centralized agents implied the 
consent of authors for all works whose ownership remained with them or was split 
with music publishers.  In addition to that, it should also be considered that it is 
frequent in the music sector to have multiple authors for the same work (e.g., one 
or two composers and one or two lyricists) and distinct rights managers for their 
respective representation.77 
To shed light on these aspects and to explain why the E.U.-wide online rights 
management of monorepertoires in the European Union is still widely incomplete 
and limited to the sole mechanical rights of the Anglo-American repertoire, it is 
essential to briefly examine the different relationships existing between music 
rights holders and collecting societies in the United Kingdom and in continental 
Europe.  In analyzing these relationships, it should always be borne in mind that 
most collecting societies in Europe worked in the same way as labour unions by 
ensuring that their members—the authors and, therefore, the supposedly weaker 
parties—were not deprived of their rights while signing their publishing 
agreements.78 
 1.  Differences Between the United Kingdom and the Continental European 
Countries 
The U.K. music repertoire constitutes a very special case in the European Union.  
Historically and culturally, the U.K. repertoire has always been associated (also for 
obvious linguistic reasons) with the U.S. music repertoire.  The Anglo-American 
music repertoires have very little in common with the repertoires of the collecting 
societies of continental-European countries such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Belgium, etc.79  A recent measurement and comparison of the economic values of 
music repertoires in a set of selected E.U. countries evidenced that, unlike the 
continental European repertoires (which are diffused and enjoyed mostly at a local, 
i.e., national) basis, the Anglo-American repertoire is characterized by an effective 
cross-border penetration and holds a clearly dominant position in Europe and 
worldwide.80 
 
 77. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 24–25. 
 78. See Dehin, supra note 17, at 225–26; Gyertyanfy, supra note 50, at 64. 
 79. See Universal/BMG Music Publ’g Decision, supra note 11, at 33 (stressing that the distinct 
allocation of original control over a work is the consequence of the historically different legal concepts 
of protection  under the copyright (United Kindom and United States) and the droit d’auteur systems 
(France and then continental Europe)); Dehin, supra note 17, at 225; Gyertyanfy, supra note 50, at 64 
(recalling that the four “major” international music publishers, holding at least seventy percent of the 
world music repertoire, belong to the Anglo-American world of copyright). 
 80. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 98–106 (showing that the U.K. music repertoire 
holds an undisputed dominant position in Europe (and worldwide) demonstrated by numbers; the music 
repertoire administered by U.K. collecting society PRS for Music was first in the 2008 worldwide 
rankings for the market value of its public performance rights and third (following U.S. collecting 
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From a legal perspective, rights holders in the Anglo-American music repertoire 
have developed similar licensing practices for the mechanical and public 
performance rights in their works.  Here, for a matter of simplification, the analysis 
is confined to E.U. borders and considers only the U.K. practice example. 
The transfer and management of mechanical and performing rights in the U.K. 
music repertoire are regulated by well established contractual practices developed 
under the shield of two U.K. collecting societies (i.e., the Performing Right Society 
and the Mechanical-Copyright Protection Society).81  In the U.K. music industry’s 
practice it is customary for the composer to assign the mechanical rights in her 
works to the individual publisher, except for the performing rights, which go to the 
PRS.82  Mechanical rights are managed by the MCPS, which operates not as an 
assignee of the relevant copyright, but rather as an exclusive agent for the copyright 
owners (i.e., the publishers).83  For foreign uses, instead, the MCPS publishers have 
traditionally appointed subpublishers in every country of exploitation by granting 
them their mechanical rights on a territorial basis.  These subpublishers are 
members of local collecting societies and appoint their respective societies for the 
management of mechanical rights on a local basis.84 
This means that U.K. music publishers can administer mechanical rights without 
the author’s approval and can easily withdraw the foreign collecting societies’ 
rights to represent their music repertoire by merely letting the agreements with 
subpublishers expire.85  Indeed, the expiration of such agreements automatically 
transfers the management of the mechanical rights back to the publisher’s exclusive 
agent, MCPS.  This is the ultimate reason for which international major music 
publishers were able to withdraw their mechanical rights and easily transfer their 
 
societies ASCAP and BMI) in the market for physical and digital sales). 
 81. See id. at 84–85.  Since 2009, “PRS for Music” is the new brand for the two U.K. collecting 
societies:  Mechanical Copyright Protection Society (“MCPS”) and Performing Right Society (“PRS”).  
Id.  In 1997 it was formed as the MCPS-PRS Alliance.  Id.  Formally, MCPS and PRS remain two 
separate societies.  Id.  The collection and administration of data is handled by PRS for Music, which 
also collects royalties for the music sector of the Republic of Ireland.  Id. 
 82. See WILLIAM R. CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  PATENTS, 
COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 520 (6th ed., 2007).  See also Universal/BMG Music 
Publ’g Decision, supra note 11, at 35 (showing that the main difference between the United States and 
the United Kingdom, in this regard, is that U.S. music publishers collect their mechanical royalties 
directly from the users, without any involvement of U.S. collecting societies). 
 83. See CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 82, at 520.  See also Dehin, supra note 17, at 225 
(explaining that all revenues are paid to the publisher, who distributes a share to the composer and 
lyricist in accordance with their private publishing agreements); Gyertyanfy, supra note 50, at 64. 
 84. See Universal/BMG Music Publ’g Decision, supra note 11, at 35.  Because no split into the 
publisher’s share and the author’s share applies here, local collecting societies pay 100 percent of the 
royalties to the subpublishers, after having retained a commission fee for their service.  Id.  
Subpublishers subsequently pass these revenues to the original publishers, who then pay out the agreed 
share of the royalties to the author.  Id.  U.S. music publishers adopt the same management model for 
their mechanical rights in the EEA countries, so that the same system applies to the U.K. and the U.S. 
music repertoires.  Id.  See also Dehin, supra note 17, at 226 (positing that in the subpublishing system 
adopted by the Anglo-American publishers, the international transfer of royalties is not regulated by 
reciprocal representation agreements). 
 85. See Dehin, supra note 17, at 226. 
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management to new online rights managers. 
For the performing rights, instead, in the United Kingdom the PRS has 
traditionally required the assignment of the rights of its two categories of members, 
namely, authors (composers and lyricists) and publishers.86  Music authors do not 
normally transfer to music publishers the performing rights over their works; 
rather, they generally transfer their rights management to the PRS.  Authors and 
publishers merely conclude a standardized agreement under which the PRS collects 
the royalties and distributes them in accordance with a division of two-thirds to the 
composer and one-third to the publisher (or equal shares if there is also a lyricist).87  
This means that publishers who are members of PRS are not in a position to 
withdraw their performing rights without the authors’ approval and without 
terminating their membership agreement with the PRS.88 
The successful withdrawal of online rights from the system of reciprocal 
representation agreements is even more complex for the continental European 
music repertoires.  Even if music publishers are important and independent players 
of music collective rights management from the outset, they are not owners of the 
rights of the works of the continental European repertoires.89  Authors of works 
registered with the collecting societies of continental European countries do not 
normally transfer the rights of such works, but merely confer to music publishers a 
share of the royalties expected from collecting societies as a countervalue for the 
publishing and promotional activity that the publishers undertake contractually.90 
This means that publishers do not own (or at least not fully) the rights covering 
online and mobile exploitations and, as a result, they cannot transfer them to 
centralized online rights managers without the authors’ contractual approval. 
 2.  Consequences for the Withdrawal of Online Rights 
Recent market developments evidence that the possibility of “easy” withdrawal 
of music repertoires exists only for the mechanical rights of the U.K. repertoire 
administered by MCPS in the United Kingdom and by subpublishers in foreign 
jurisdictions. 
Instead, for the performing rights of the U.K. repertoire and for both 
reproduction and performing rights of the continental European repertoires, the 
withdrawal and the subsequent transfer of the rights to specialized agencies is 
 
 86. See CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 82, at 520–21. 
 87. This standard can be modified by the parties, but in no way can the publisher be granted more 
than half of the royalties. See id. at 521. 
 88. See Dehin, supra note 17, at 226. 
 89. See Gyertyanfy, supra note 50, at 64. 
 90. See Dehin, supra note 17, at 226.  The revenue allocation criteria are developed by the 
internal practices of each national society, in accordance with the resolutions of its governing bodies.  
Id.  For instance, SACEM (France) allocates one-third to publishers and two-thirds to authors; GEMA 
(Germany) applies the same rates for performing rights, but it applies different rates (three-fifths to 
authors and two-fifths to publishers) for mechanical rights; SIAE (Italy), SGAE (Spain) and SABAM 
(Belgium) grant fifty percent to authors and fifty percent to publishers.  Id. 
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impossible without the authors’ or their collecting societies’ consent.91 
As a result, music publishers cannot successfully withdraw their repertoires 
from the mandate to foreign societies and to their system of reciprocal 
representation agreements, unless authors, who are legally owners or coowners of 
those repertoires, do the same thing by acting either individually or through the 
intermediation of their own collecting societies. 
What seems remarkable here, given the emphasis placed by the European 
Commission on this issue, is that music authors seem largely unaware of their 
freedom to withdraw their online rights from national societies and to transfer them 
to another collective rights manager of their choice.92  The contractual mechanisms 
through which rights holders have established or appointed new licensing agents 
and regional rights “hubs” show that authors have transferred their rights on a 
collective basis, through the representation of their respective collecting societies.93 
Only a very few among the new licensing entities, however, were able to acquire 
all necessary rights in order to create effective “one stop shops” for online and 
mobile music services on a European scale.  The most privileged actors in this 
enterprise were the publishers of the Anglo-American music repertoire and the new 
licensing entities that they appointed as their online rights agents.  As we have 
seen, organizations or initiatives such as CELAS, PAECOL and PEL could easily 
acquire authors’ rights through the direct involvement of major European collecting 
societies such as PRS for Music, GEMA and SGAE. 
The smoothest case was certainly that of the PEL initiative, in which SGAE 
acquired both the mechanical and performing shares for its E.U.-wide licensing of 
Sony’s and Peer Music’s Latin American repertoires through the withdrawals of 
these publishers and the parallel withdrawals of their Latin American authors.  The 
withdrawal of authors’ rights from the mandates of other EEA collecting societies, 
in particular, took place through the representation of SGAE, which is now the 
representative in Europe of the members of the Central and Latin American 
collecting societies.94 
CELAS and PAECOL were placed in a similar position since their founders 
(and owners, i.e., PRS for Music and GEMA) guaranteed a very wide withdrawal 
and transfer on behalf of their authors to their new online rights management 
subsidiaries.  However, CELAS (which is incorporated under German law) has 
been able to license directly the sole mechanical rights of EMI Publishing’s Anglo-
 
 91. Id.  See also Gyertyanfy, supra note 50, at 64 (adding that the derivative right owner capacity 
of the Anglo-American publishers can be questioned in those European countries where the transfer of 
authors’ economic rights is either fully excluded or allowed under strict conditions only, as found in 
Germany, Austria and Hungary; hence, in such countries even the withdrawal of the Anglo-American 
mechanical rights could be troublesome because the legal consequences of the transfer, exploitation and 
the method of exercising those rights are governed by the copyright law of those particular countries). 
 92. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 23. 
 93. See supra Sections III.A and III.B. 
 94. ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 31–32.  Interestingly, SGAE obtained such 
representation of Central and Latin American authors for their online exploitations—for the whole EEA 
territory, and not just the Spanish territory—through an extension of the territorial scope of the pre-
existing reciprocal representation agreements SGAE had with their collecting societies. 
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American repertoire.  This has occurred for two reasons.  First, GEMA and PRS for 
Music (as all the EEA collecting societies), are still managing the public 
performance rights of their members by themselves and on a strictly territorial 
basis, under their (secret!) system of reciprocal representation.95  Second, GEMA 
and PRS for Music had no representative power for a wide portion (approximately 
forty percent) of CELAS’s half-a-million works, which is made of split copyright 
works for which CELAS represents only a few of their multiple owners.96  A few 
years after its founding, therefore, CELAS does not yet hold a position to directly 
sell full packages of mechanical and performing rights for online and mobile 
exploitations of its repertoire. 
Nowadays, the licensing solutions of CELAS, at least in this regard, seem to 
have evolved.  The licensing agency claims to be able to offer the mechanical of its 
Anglo-American EMI mechanical shares and, in addition, for those EMI shares, to 
include also the associated performing rights shares.  CELAS assures its actual and 
potential licensees on its website that it disposes of the full set of rights for the 
Anglo-American EMI repertoire for online and mobile uses, “although in some 
cases CELAS may opt to license its rights via an approved territorial agent.”97  This 
circumstance clearly indicates that public performance rights that supplement its 
package of online rights are licensed indirectly and stem from sublicensing 
agreements that CELAS has entered into with all local collecting societies 
(including GEMA).98 
B.  UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
The establishment of the aforementioned E.U.-wide rights management 
organizations raised important legal questions that have remained unanswered so 
far.  A first important question concerns the legal status of such organizations and 
the legitimacy of their licensing activities under national law.99  This aspect is 
particularly relevant in those E.U. member states in which collecting societies, due 
to their own regulatory frameworks, are subject to forms of strict or intermediate 
control by supervisory authorities.100  Further questions refer to the supposedly 
nonexclusive relationship between major international music publishers and 
 
 95. See supra Section IV.A. 
 96. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 29–30. 
 97. CELAS, supra note 56. 
 98. This is the same licensing solution for performing rights implemented by the IMPEL 
initiative, which is also managed by PRS for Music.  See supra Section III.A. 
 99. See infra Section IV.B.1. 
 100. See Guibault & van Gompel, supra note 40, at 125–30 (analyzing and classifying national 
collecting societies in the European Union according to the distinct set of rules that each member state 
established for the formation and operation of collective management organizations).  Here, this Article 
follows a distinction proposed by these authors among countries having adopted “strict,” “intermediate” 
or “de minimis” forms of supervision for collecting societies and having established a supervisory 
authority.  Id.  The authors conclude that the vast majority of member states fall under the category of 
intermediate supervision, whereas Germany, Austria and Portugal should be viewed as “strict 
supervision” countries.  Id.  The least supervised and regulated activities are those of collecting societies 
in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Poland. 
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organizations such as CELAS and PAECOL and the issue of equal treatment of 
music repertoires whenever national collecting societies manage both their own 
repertoire and that of a major publisher.101 
 1.  Legal Status of the New Licensors and Legitimacy of Their Activities 
Under National Law: The Case of Germany 
Germany is supposed to provide the most comprehensive system of control of 
collecting societies on the international level and has assigned the role of 
supervisory authority for collecting societies to the German Patent and Trademark 
Office (“GPTO”).102  Under a piece of legislation specifically devoted to 
copyright’s administration, the GPTO issues prior authorizations to anyone wishing 
to do business in the collective rights management sector and ensures that 
collective managers do not abuse their powers while dealing with both rights 
holders and users.103  More generally, the German supervisory authority controls on 
a permanent basis whether a collecting society complies with its statutory duties of 
diligence, fairness and nondiscrimination.104 
In February 2007, the GPTO inquired into the legal status of CELAS with a 
view to ascertaining whether it should have been considered a collective rights 
management organization under the meaning of the German Act on the 
Administration of Copyright.105  The GPTO decided that CELAS was not a 
collecting society under German law since this joint venture did not administer the 
rights of a plurality of rights holders and provided its services to the sole benefit of 
a publisher on a strictly commercial basis.  As a result, CELAS was found not to be 
subject to the obligations set out under the 1965 Act on the Administration of 
Copyright.106 
Even if the GPTO’s decision seemed to grant CELAS a certain degree of 
immunity from the above mentioned kind of supervision, a heavy problem of 
legitimacy for its licensing activities started materializing in June 2009.  At that 
time, a decision of the District Court (Landgericht) of Munich questioned the 
legitimacy of splitting the management of mechanical and performing rights for 
technically and economically unitary modes of exploitation.107  The case was based 
 
 101. See infra Sections IV.B.2, IV.B.3. 
 102. See Guibault & van Gompel, supra note 40, at 127–28. 
 103. See Gsestz über die Wahrenehmung von Urheberrechten und verwandten Schutzrechte 
[UrhG] [Copyright Administration Law], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBL. I at 1294 (Ger.). 
 104. See Guibault & van Gompel, supra note 40, at 127–28. 
 105. Alexander Wolf & Till Evert, Rechtsbeziehungen der GEMA zu ausländischen 
Verwertungsgesellschaften, in RECHT UND PRAXIS DER GEMA:  HANDBUCH UND KOMMENTAR 812, 
814 (Reinhold Kreile et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
 106. Id. 
 107. MyVideo Broadband S.R.L. v. CELAS GmbH, Langericht [LG] [District Court] June 25, 
2009, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht (ZUM) 788 (2009) (Ger.).  See generally Lucie Guibault 
& Stef Van Gompel, Collective Management in the European Union, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF 
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 135, 162–63 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2d ed. 2010); Gyertyanfy, supra 
note 50, at 71, 77–78; Big Problems for CELAS in Germany, MUSIC & COPYRIGHT’S BLOG (Sept. 18, 
2009, 2:14 PM), http://musicandcopyright.wordpress.com/2009/09/18/big-problems-for-celas-in-
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on the assumption that CELAS administered the sole mechanical rights of the EMI 
repertoire and licensed the associated performing rights indirectly. Considering the 
claim of German online operator MyVideo, the District Court of Munich found that 
German copyright law did not allow for the split of these two rights since for a 
specific kind of use to be licensed validly the use must be clearly separable, 
economically and technically autonomous and unitary.108  The Munich court took 
the view that online transmission of copyrighted content could not be kept distinct 
and separate from the acts of reproduction that constitute a technical necessity, 
since these acts are inherent to the act of making copyrighted works available to the 
public.  The judgment maintained that the right of online exploitation cannot be 
split into two separate rights, i.e., a right of making content available and a distinct 
right of reproduction.109  If the split were admissible and distinct rights holders held 
the mechanical and making available rights over the same music works, users 
would face substantial legal uncertainty and the risk of double claims with regard to 
a uniform technical process.110 
This argument led the court to the conclusion that EMI had not validly 
transferred its mechanical rights to CELAS for digital uses because digital 
reproductions, as such, were not separable from the acts of making content 
available either technically or economically.111  This meant that CELAS could not 
be deemed to be in a position to control and legally restrict digital reproductions for 
the EMI repertoire against unauthorized content provider MyVideo.  A subsequent 
corollary was that an online music service like MyVideo should have obtained all 
necessary licenses for the use of online content in Germany from local collecting 
society GEMA.112 
The Munich Court of Appeals (Oberlandesgericht) upheld the decision of the 
District Court in April 2010 and the case is currently pending before the Federal 
Court of Justice, after CELAS’s appeal.113  It seems premature to draw a 
conclusion from this case since it dealt with a copyright infringement claim and 
touched upon the legitimacy of CELAS’s licensing activity only indirectly.  This 
means that the licenses that CELAS has granted so far for online exploitations of 
the EMI Anglo-American repertoire remain unaffected.  However, it is evident that 
the final court ruling and the settlement of the whole case can raise a strong issue of 
legitimacy for the entire functioning of the two European online rights managers 
(i.e., CELAS and PAECOL) of EMI’s and Sony’s Anglo-American repertoire. 
 
germany/ (summarizing the case in English). 
 108. See Gyertyanfy, supra note 50, at 78, n. 77. 
 109. Id.  The court ruling made this conclusion even clearer (and stronger) when it stated that 
independent online reproduction rights (under section 16 of the German Copyright Act) do not exist. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Guibault & van Gompel, supra note 107, at 163. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See CELAS GmbH v. MyVideo Broadband S.R.L, Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of 
Appeal] Apr. 20, 2010, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht (ZUM) 709 (2010) (Ger.).  See also 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Pending case Az. I ZR 116/10 (Ger.). 
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 2.  Nonexclusivity of the Licensing Mandates 
Another question that deserves attention here is the nonexclusivity of the 
mandates conferred by major music publishers like EMI and Sony to new 
collective rights managers such as CELAS and PAECOL.  Nonexclusivity makes 
sense if third parties also license the rights entrusted to these entities.114  However, 
there is no evidence that EMI and Sony entrusted the same rights granted to 
CELAS and PAECOL to other agents or collecting societies.115 
EMI is reported to have initially granted exclusivity to CELAS and, at a later 
stage, to have agreed with CELAS upon the removal of the exclusivity clause from 
their agency contract.116 Interestingly, however, CELAS seems to maintain its 
original vocation as exclusive licensor of the mechanical rights of EMI’s Anglo-
American repertoire since, as stated on its website, these rights are only available 
through CELAS or CELAS approved agents.117  The status of exclusivity seems to 
be very ambiguous and misleading also for other collecting societies, some of 
which still describe CELAS as the exclusive licensor of the EMI repertoire.118 
Therefore, it can reasonably be inferred that, due to the heavy lack of 
transparency on such an important issue, commercial users might have entered into 
agreements with CELAS, assuming that CELAS exclusively represented the EMI 
repertoire for online exploitations. 
 3.  Equal Treatment of Music Repertoires 
Finally, some emphasis should be placed on the issue of equal treatment of 
music repertoires, whenever a collecting society is mandated to play both the role 
of specialized online rights manager for a major international music publisher and 
that of licensor of its own domestic repertoire. 
For instance, this has clearly happened in the case of the PEDL initiative for the 
E.U.-wide management of the Warner Chappell music repertoire.119  Under the 
model agreement made available by Warner Chappell, every E.U. collecting 
 
 114. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 35. 
 115. Id. (reporting that none of the interviewees, responding on behalf of CELAS and PAECOL, 
confirmed whether or not these new entities should be considered as exclusive agents of EMI’s and 
Sony’s repertoires).  As the Study observes, one should not rule out the possibility of these music 
publishers retaining the right to grant relevant licenses themselves.  Id. 
 116. Id. at 30. 
 117. CELAS, supra note 56.  The CELAS website provides: 
CELAS provides a one-stop-shop for pan-European licensing.  It is responsible for licensing the 
rights of EMI Music Publishing throughout Europe when those rights are used in an online or 
mobile service.  CELAS will issue a single new license to cover exploitation of this repertoire on 
a pan-European basis.  As of 1st January 2007 these rights are only available through CELAS or 
via CELAS approved agents. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 118. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 30 (reporting that one of the collecting societies 
interviewed by the Study’s authors (SABAM, Belgium) described CELAS as the exclusive licensor of 
EMI’s repertoire). 
 119. See supra Section III.A. 
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society is granted—on a (truly) nonexclusive basis—the possibility of managing 
the publisher’s Anglo-American repertoire, on condition that the society ensures 
conditions of efficiency, transparency and accountability in its services.120 
According to the principle of nondiscrimination embodied in the 2005 
recommendation of the E.U. Commission, collecting societies have an obligation to 
treat all rights holders equally in relation to all elements of the management service 
provided.121  This means that societies granting licenses under the PEDL agreement 
should afford the same treatment to both their domestic repertoire and Warner 
Chappell’s music repertoire.  To the contrary, it is reported that the PEDL initiative 
challenges this principle openly since Warner Chappell imposes more favorable 
licensing terms for the management of its repertoire to the collecting societies 
involved in the initiative (e.g., maximum commission fees and absence of 
deductions for cultural and social purposes from its repertoire’s revenues).122 
It should be emphasized here that the views the E.U. Commission recently took 
on regarding nondiscrimination of music repertoires are clearly contradictory.  In 
its 2005 recommendation, as we have seen, the Commission restated the principle 
of nondiscrimination between categories of rights holders and looked at it as one of 
the key principles that national collecting societies should have followed. 
Nondiscrimination has strong justifications at both the international and national 
levels.123  At the international level, nondiscrimination is a guarantee for foreign 
rights holders and reflects the well known principle of national treatment and 
formal reciprocity embodied under international copyright treaties.124  At the 
national level, nondiscriminatory conditions of tariffs and distribution of royalties 
are a guarantee for national rights holders in a legal context in which most 
European collecting societies enjoy a de jure or de facto monopoly and are not 
allowed to refuse licenses to customers.125 
 
 120. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 32–33. 
 121. See Recommendation of Oct. 18, 2005, supra note 21, at 56 (according to which “[t]he 
relationship between collective rights managers and right-holders, whether based on contract or statutory 
membership rules should be based on the following principles:  (a) any category of right-holder is 
treated equally in relation to all elements of the management service provided . . . ”). 
 122. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 33 (referring to a presentation made by European 
Grouping of Societies of Authors and Composers (“GESAC”), “Collective management as regards 
cross-border music services,” at a conference organized by the Association Belge pour le Droit 
d’Auteur, Brussels, March 9, 2009). 
 123. See Gyertyanfy, supra note 50, at 63. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Dehin, supra note 17, at 223–24 (emphasizing that the principle of nondiscrimination, 
which ensures a regime of identical tariffs for any kind of music work, is also beneficial to commercial 
users, who are protected against unjustified discriminatory treatment that can benefit their competitors).  
See also Case C-52/07, Kanal 5 Ltd., TV 4 AB v. Föreningen Svenska Tonsättares Internationella 
Musikbyrå (STIM), 2009 OJ (C 32) 2, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:032:0002:0003:EN:PDF (finding that it was appropriate to verify 
whether the application of differentiated licensing terms for private and public broadcasters by Swedish 
collecting society STIM was reasonable in relation to the economic value of the service provided by that 
organization).  As held by the Court, it should be ascertained whether differentiated licensing fees 
constitute a discriminatory practice under article 82 of the EC Treaty (now article 102 of TFEU), which 
prohibits abuses of dominant position.  Id. 
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Unfortunately, in an important antitrust analysis of the European music sector, 
which preceded Universal’s acquisition of BMG in 2007, the Commission openly 
contradicted the enforcement of the principle it had advocated and restated in its 
2005 recommendation.126 Surprisingly, when analysing the issue of 
nondiscrimination between repertoires, the analysis at issue assumed naturally (as if 
it were not a sensitive issue) that nondiscriminatory tariffs and the general 
obligation to license would likely be abandoned, at least in the digital environment, 
where collecting societies are expected to adopt the mere role of agents and service 
providers for the publishers.127  As soon as the transition to the new online 
licensing regime will be completed through the full right holder withdrawal of 
online rights—this was the Commission’s conclusion on that occasion—collecting 
societies will no longer act in the traditional context of their usual regulatory 
frameworks.128 
V.  INDEPENDENT MANAGEMENT OF ALL ONLINE MUSIC RIGHTS 
BY VERTICALLY INTEGRATED RIGHTS HOLDERS 
A short digression on the role that independent copyright management plays in 
the online music sector is of crucial importance to understand where the (still 
unaccomplished) restructuring of online rights management in the European Union 
is leading. 
It should always be borne in mind that the legitimate supply of online services 
presupposes the clearance of both copyright and recording (i.e., so called 
“neighbouring”) rights. In the E.U. legal framework performing artists and 
recording producers enjoy, for their performances and for the sound recordings that 
incorporate such performances, respectively, the same rights that authors (and, 
indirectly, music publishers) enjoy on the use of their works.129 This means that 
three layers of full property rights protection coexist on the same digital goods 
exploited in the context of online music services. 
The type of protection granted to performances and sound recordings evolved 
over time and became as strong as it is today with the advent of the digital 
environment.  The emergence and the fast development of digital technologies and 
of a new medium like the Internet raised unprecedented challenges for the 
management of all music rights, mostly due to the ubiquitous and fully 
decentralized (or “point-to-point”) nature of online communication.  In this new 
scenario, the perfect character of digital copies embodying sound recordings placed 
a strong emphasis on the second and third layers of music copyright protection by 
challenging the investments of record companies and the reward for performing 
 
 126. Universal/BMG Music Publ’g Decision, supra note 11. 
 127. Id. at 50. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 1, art. 2–3. The subject matter of the rights related 
to copyright (or “neighboring” rights) was harmonized at E.U. level by Directive 92/100/EEC, 1992 O.J. 
(L 346) 61, which was recently replaced (with no substantive changes) by Directive 2006/115/EC, art. 
7–9, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 28. 
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artists conferred by recording rights.130 
The advent of digital technologies made it possible for digital (i.e., intangible) 
copies to become a perfect substitute for the physical (i.e., tangible) copies.  Such 
perfection inevitably affected (and almost disrupted, as some would say) the market 
for sale of physical records, which was the primary form of exploitation of music 
works for the recording industry.  In the analog world, whenever sound recordings 
were used in an intangible form (i.e., over the air) through radio or television 
broadcasts, these uses were clearly viewed as a case of secondary exploitation, in 
comparison to primary physical exploitations.131  In the digital environment, 
instead, the dematerialized use of sound recordings on the Internet became a form 
of primary exploitation itself, having the potential to replace, or at least to 
dramatically reduce the scope of, markets for physical records.  The distinction 
between primary and secondary exploitation is relevant here because it explains 
why, in the predigital era, neither U.S. copyright law nor the E.U. legal framework 
conferred protection to secondary (i.e., intangible) forms of exploitation of music 
performances and sound recordings through the recognition of full property 
rights.132 
At a time when intangible copies on the Internet became nearly perfect 
substitutes for tangible copies and started threatening their primary exploitation in 
the offline world, the record industry successfully lobbied for legislative upgrades 
that eventually resulted in the recognition of exclusive rights covering the 
interactive making available of digital sound recordings to the public under both 
U.S. and E.U. law.133  As a result, the law ended up conferring to second- and third-
layer rights holders the power to control whether or not their performances and 
sound recordings can be made available legitimately on the Internet. 
Even if the 2005 recommendation applied to copyright and recording rights 
alike, so far its impact has been perceived only in the field of author and publisher 
rights management.134  The Commission’s action does not seem to have altered the 
management of music performer and record producer rights. 
The impact of the restructuring of online rights management is negligible since 
European collective rights managers of sound recording rights have not established 
an advanced system of reciprocal representation.  In addition to that, it must be 
 
 130. See Marco Ricolfi, Individual and Collective Management of Copyright in a Digital 
Environment, in COPYRIGHT LAW:  A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 283, 287 (Paul 
Torremans ed., 2007). 
 131. Id. at 290–91. 
 132. Ricolfi emphasizes that the type of copyright that protects sound recordings under U.S. law, 
before the adoption of the Digital Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 covered acts of 
reproduction and distribution without extending protection to public performances, which were clearly 
viewed as forms of secondary (and indirect) exploitation (i.e., uncompensated radio and TV broadcasts 
were meant to enhance a sound recording popularity and to lead to an increase of record sales).  In the 
European Union, instead, rights holders in sound recordings and music performances were granted a 
mere (and limited) right to remuneration in relation to acts of communication to the public of their sound 
recordings.  Digital Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006); 
Ricolfi, supra note 130, at 290.  See also GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 16, at 686. 
 133. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6), § 114(d); Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 1, art. 3.2. 
 134. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 22. 
MAZZIOTTI Final 12/5/2011  8:55 PM 
788 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [34:4 
considered that record producers have traditionally managed their rights in sound 
recordings on an individual basis, after having acquired the rights of performing 
artists in their performances at the time of the record production.  To be more 
precise, record companies normally grant individual blanket licenses for their 
reproduction rights and their (online) rights of making recordings available to the 
public interactively.  Collective licenses are granted by record producers’ collective 
rights managers for the rights of communication to the public and for broadcasting 
and “simulcasting” rights.135  This means that, to offer legitimate online music 
services, commercial users need to make additional deals with all recording 
producers holding online rights in the recordings they use so as to supplement the 
authorizations granted by collecting societies and/or new E.U.-wide specialized 
agents managing author and publisher rights. 
The move towards monorepertoire collective management for the publishing 
rights (i.e., authors’ and publishers’ rights) should therefore be contextualized and 
correlated to the pre-existing, strongly individualized management of recording 
rights in the digital environment and to the strategic power of control that 
ownership of these rights confers.  It seems evident to me that the progressive 
abandon of the traditional collective management schemes was mainly designed to 
let major international music groups manage their publishing rights in the same 
way as they administer their recording (i.e., second- and third-layer) rights on a 
multinational basis through their subsidiaries. 
The bold move of the E.U. Commission towards monorepertoire collective 
management was intended to be mostly beneficial for the four international media 
conglomerates which own seventy percent of the world music repertoire and group 
together the major publishing companies and the major recording companies (i.e., 
EMI, Sony, Universal Music and Warner). Indeed, these vertically integrated rights 
holders hold an ideal position to package all necessary rights (i.e, publishing plus 
recording rights) in their repertoires and to sell them to commercial users through 
E.U.-wide monorepertoire blanket licenses issued and enforced by their newly 
established centralized agents. 
Perfect centralization and individualization of online rights management by 
specialized agents of international major music groups is not a reality yet, however. 
This is mainly due to structural problems of old fashioned copyright ownership 
regimes and management practices developed for mechanical and public 
performance rights at the national level.  However, that seemed to be the ultimate 
objective sought by the recent structural change of licensing models in the 
European Union.  Interestingly, such conclusion is not a matter of conjecture.  To 
the contrary, this conclusion can be easily found in the detailed and lengthy review 
of the E.U. Commission regarding the above mentioned merger between Universal 
and BMG in May 2007. 
In analyzing the potential consequences of a merger between Universal Music 
Publishing and BMG, the Commission acknowledged that the publishing and the 
recording music markets were widely dominated by the above mentioned 
 
 135. See Creative Content, supra note 3, at 5. 
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international media conglomerates through their publishing and recording 
subsidiaries (or “sister companies,” as the Commission defined them in its 
review).136  The Commission measured the market shares of the two merging 
parties and of the other competitors in all relevant markets, including the specific 
segments of publishing rights, recording rights and online rights.  The final 
decision on this case observed in particular that, due to a uniquely strong 
integration of its publishing and recording businesses, Universal, after the proposed 
merger, could have exerted control over a large percentage (almost fifty percent) of 
the “must have” Anglo-American repertoire in the new online music sector.137 
For this reason the Commission decided to clear the merger only after 
Universal’s submission of a divestiture package for important music catalogues of 
Anglo-American works, which included not only online rights but also the whole 
publisher’s copyrights (i.e., mechanical, performance, synchronisation and print 
rights) and contracts with authors.138  The circumstance that, through the 
withdrawal of its music repertoire from the system of reciprocal representation, 
Universal would have gained pricing power that was previously kept in the hands 
of local collecting societies forced the Commission to act very cautiously in the 
merger approval.  As observed in the final decision, the higher concentration of 
market power deriving form the merger would have given Universal an easy chance 
and a high incentive to increase prices for online rights on the most commercially 
valuable repertoire.139 
What matters here, in more general terms, is the assumption (or prophecy) that 
the Commission’s cautious conclusion was based upon: 
After the re-structuring of the online rights market, all vertically integrated music 
companies will in the future be able to negotiate the access to the combined package 
of recording rights and publishing rights including fully and partly owned publishing 
rights for online applications.  The reason for this is that both categories of rights are 
held and controlled by the same undertaking and the customers are also the same.  An 
online music provider will therefore have to negotiate with a music company whose 
market power will derive from the titles it controls either by recording rights or by 
publishing rights.140 
In my view, these statements are clear enough to prove that the ultimate 
objective of the restructuring of online rights management was that of facilitating 
the business practices and accommodating the economic needs of the major 
international music groups in their long-lasting struggle for independence from 
national collecting societies.141  
In opting for a pan-European monorepertoire licensing model, the Commission 
 
 136. See Universal/BMG Music Publ’g Decision, supra note 11, at 18–19, 71(noting that this 
merger did not include the record business of BMG, which was previously acquired by Sony). 
 137. See Commission Decision 2007/595, of 22 May 2007 Declaring a Concentration Compatible 
with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement, 2007 O.J. (L 230) 12, 13 (EC). 
 138. Id. at 14. 
 139. Id. at 13. 
 140. See Universal/BMG Music Publ’g Decision, supra note 11, at 71. 
 141. See Gyertyanfy, supra note 50, at 77–79 (reaching a similar conclusion). 
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seemed to act as an ally of major music publishers in their attempt to minimize the 
economic impact of the royalty collecting services of European collecting societies 
on the turnover of their recording businesses, which dramatically were hit by illegal 
file sharing activities and scarce profitability of online music businesses in Europe.  
As shown in the next Section, however, the Commission did not make the shift 
from collecting society control to corporate control plausible, nor did it consider 
carefully the negative effects of such a shift for society at large. 
VI.  CURRENT SCENARIOS 
In the previous Section, I argued that the ultimate aim of the new E.U.-wide 
monorepertoire licensing models in the online music sector was to enable (or at 
least to facilitate) the vertically integrated management of publishing and recording 
rights, mostly to the benefit of the multinational music industry.  This Section 
discusses pros and cons of the implementation of the new online rights 
management models and identifies prospective winners and losers in the scenarios 
that have materialized so far. 
A.  MAJOR MUSIC GROUPS: A BOLD MOVE TOWARDS INDEPENDENT RIGHTS 
MANAGEMENT 
The creation of strong business partnerships with new licensing arms of the 
major collecting societies in Europe (i.e., PRS, GEMA, SACEM and SGAE) 
placed major music publishers in a position to directly negotiate all the conditions 
of management of their online rights, obtaining a preferential regime which 
contradicts the above mentioned principle of nondiscrimination between rights 
holders and their repertoires. 
However, it would be misleading to present this strong alliance between major 
publishers and major collecting societies as a sudden or unexpected breakthrough.  
A preferential regime for the repertoires of the major music publishers was already 
granted, to a certain extent, through the fixation of lower commission fees for the 
management services provided by collecting societies for the clearance of major 
music publishers’ mechanical rights under the so called Cannes Agreements.142 
This preferential treatment was linked to a centralized rights clearance system 
for mechanical rights developed in the European Union as of the 1970s.143  At that 
time, the larger Western European collecting societies started clearing mechanical 
rights for the whole volume of records produced by the four or five major 
international record producers for all E.U. countries by themselves (i.e., excluding 
 
 142. See Frabboni, supra note 24, at 385–88.  Originally negotiated in 1997 with all collecting 
societies in Europe, and renewed in 2000, the Cannes Agreement between major music publishers and 
mechanical copyright collecting societies was renegotiated and renewed in 2002.  This was an extension 
of the previous agreements and concerned in particular the maximum administration fees that collecting 
societies could charge their members for services of rights clearance concerning reproduction of sound 
recordings on physical carriers. 
 143. Id. at 386.  See also Gyertyanfy, supra note 50, at 60. 
MAZZIOTTI Final 12/5/2011  8:55 PM 
2011] NEW LICENSING MODELS FOR ONLINE MUSIC SERVICES 791 
other European collecting societies from this business).144  Because, in the case of 
vertically integrated music groups, the entity owning the major record producer is 
also (directly or indirectly) the owner of the publishing rights, the license fees paid 
by record producers to the collecting society are allocated to the publishing branch 
of the same major after deduction of management fees.145  As a result of the Cannes 
agreements, these management fees are lower in the case of a major music 
publisher.146 
More generally, major publishers have been able to deeply influence the 
decision making process of music rights management through the participation of 
their representatives in the activities and in the resolutions of the governing bodies 
of national collecting societies.  As provided under the Common Declaration on 
Governance in Collective Management Societies and on Management of Online 
Rights in Music Works, issued by the International Confederation of Music 
Publishers (“ICMP”) and the European Grouping of Societies of Authors and 
Composers (“GESAC”) in 2006, now one-third of the seats on the board of 
directors of collecting societies is reserved for music publishers.147 
The new monorepertoire licensing models in the online music sector 
indisputably increase the bargaining power of major music publishers, especially in 
their relationships with the specific collecting societies (or subsidiaries of them) 
they appoint as their exclusive or nonexclusive licensing agents.  Major music 
publishers can easily dictate the adoption of licensing and management conditions 
for their repertoires (for both online or offline uses) by threatening the withdrawal 
of their online rights and repertoires, which would lead to significant losses in the 
turnover of the licensing entities involved.148 
As pointed out above, the enhanced subjection of collecting societies to the 
leverage of major publishers inevitably challenges the well known principle of 
equal treatment (or nondiscrimination) between repertoires and distinct categories 
of rights holders.149  The circumstance that the 2005 recommendation restated the 
principle with no practical effects on the operation of new rights management 
organizations raises doubts about the adequacy of a mere soft law instrument for 
the safeguard of individual authors’ and small music publishers’ interests. 
 
 144. See Frabboni, supra note 24, at 386 (explaining that the practice of centralized agreements for 
the clearance of mechanical rights is based on an extensive interpretation of the reciprocal representation 
agreements concluded by collecting societies and on the grounds of the well established concerted 
negotiation taking place between BIEM (umbrella association of mechanical copyright collecting 
societies) and IFPI (international association of record producers), which contract on behalf of their 
members). 
 145. See Gyertyanfy, supra note 50, at 60. 
 146. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 95–96. 
 147. See Dehin, supra note 17, at 229.  See also ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 96. 
 148. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 96. 
 149. See supra Section IV.B.3. 
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B.  COLLECTING SOCIETIES AND THE INDIRECT THREAT TO CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY 
National collecting societies excluded from the small circle of E.U.-wide 
licensors of major publishers’ repertoires for digital uses are definitely the most 
affected stakeholders in the new scenario.  Many European collecting societies 
openly contested the major international music publishers’ direct involvement in 
the organization of new licensing bodies and argued that the loss of mandates for 
the administration of online rights is likely to reduce their turnover significantly.150  
Moreover, due the decreased number of works managed, these societies claimed 
that their administration costs would have increased, causing a subsequent 
reduction of revenues for local authors and music publishers and an inevitable 
contraction of the culture-supporting tasks that all of them have an obligation to 
perform under their national laws, reciprocal representation agreements or by 
laws.151 
 A recent study on collecting societies and cultural diversity (the ELIAMEP 
Study) found that the entrustment of major publishers’ rights to specialized online 
rights managers will affect mainly the functioning of small and medium sized 
collecting societies.152  The study argued that—deprived of the Anglo-American 
repertoire for online exploitations—the economic sustainability of such societies is 
likely to be seriously endangered with the predictable growth and expansion of the 
(still immature) E.U. online market.153  In the absence of major music repertoires to 
manage, the profitability of local collecting societies will largely depend on the 
volume of their remaining repertoire and their commercial appeal. 
The ELIAMEP Study evidenced that the music repertoires of the smaller 
Western European countries and of all Eastern European member states have 
mostly a local diffusion and do not easily penetrate European markets, for both 
cultural and economic reasons.154  To reach this conclusion, the study measured 
and compared the economic values of the domestic repertoire of a selected number 
of European countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Belgium) by 
deducting foreign repertoires’ shares from the total revenues of each national 
collecting society (respectively: PRS for Music, GEMA, SIAE and SABAM) and 
taking account of what each society received for uses of its repertoire abroad (in the 
 
 150. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 22–23 n.24 (making reference to the Joint Position 
of collecting societies AEPI (Greece), AKKA-LAA (Latria), AKM (Austria), Artisjus (Hungary), 
Austro Mechana (Austria), BUMA/STEMRA (Netherlands), EAU (Estonia), HDS (Croatia), IMRO 
(Ireland), KODA (Denmark), LATGA-A (Lithuania), Musicautor (Bulgaria), OSA (Czech Republic), 
SABAM (Belgium), SAZAS (Slovenia), SOZA (Slovakia), SPA (Portugal), STEG (Iceland), TONO 
(Norway), UCMR-ADA (Romania), and ZAIKS (Poland) on the Recommendation of October 18, 
2005). 
 151. See Dehin, supra note 17, at 224 (noting that collecting societies within which there is a high 
degree of solidarity among members apply social and cultural deductions on rights holders’ revenues); 
Gyertyanfy, supra note 50, at 66 (recalling that collecting societies have agreed so far to limit 
deductions to a maximum of ten percent of all collected revenues). 
 152. See ELIAMEP STUDY, supra note 34, at 97–98. 
 153. Id. at 97. 
 154. Id. at 98–106. 
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European Union as well as in the rest of the world).  This comparison clearly 
revealed that the presence of a wide range of foreign repertoires in the E.U. 
territory was very limited and music repertoires are exploited mostly at the local 
level, with the big exception of the international (i.e., Anglo-American and Latin 
American) repertoire.155 
The withdrawal of the online rights of the Anglo-American repertoire from the 
mandates conferred on local collecting societies constitutes a potential threat for 
local collecting societies and for their music.  The economic consequences of the 
major publishers’ withdrawals are still limited today since the licenses and 
revenues related to online music services remain quantitatively modest.156  
However, this situation has been changing quickly as a result of the predictable 
expansion of digital music markets following the growth of broadband Internet 
services in Europe.157 
The fragmentation of repertoires stemming from the centralization of online 
rights management for single publishers’ music titles gives pan-European 
commercial exploiters a high incentive to seek authorization for the exploitation of 
only the most commercially appealing repertoires.  This entails concrete risks of 
marginalization for local repertoires that are certainly higher for smaller domestic 
repertoires, like those of Eastern European countries and of Western European 
countries, such as Greece, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium and the 
Scandinavian countries.158 
The only means that small societies have at their disposal in order to face the 
competition of the biggest repertoires and of the wealthiest rights managers is to 
improve the quality of their services (even from a technology related perspective) 
and to create regional hubs for the smooth licensing of joint music repertoires.159 
As things stand, then, it seems fair to conclude that a prospective problem of 
preservation of and promotion of cultural diversity undoubtedly exists and E.U. 
lawmakers should take it into consideration in their next moves, as constitutionally 
 
 155. While measuring intra-European trade flows for each of the above mentioned societies, the 
ELIAMEP Study found that PRS for Music's revenues coming from other E.U. collecting societies were 
6.71 times higher that what PRS distributed to E.U. societies.  As for the repertoire revenues that PRS 
for Music received from foreign societies, in 2008, 60.9 percent came from other E.U. member states, 
whereas fifteen percent came from the United States.  Id. at 89–91. 
 156. Id. at 39, 52, 63, 82 (observing that the value of 2007 digital music sales on the total value of 
recorded music sales was six per cent in Belgium, 5.5 percent in Germany, 7.2 percent in Italy, and 8.3 
percent in the United Kingdom). 
 157. Email interview with Gabriela Lopes, Int’l Fed’n of the Phonographic Indus. (IFPI), Dir. of 
Mkt. Research & Analysis (Mar. 22, 2011) (providing updated information on online music revenues in 
Europe between 2007 and 2010).  According to IFPI figures, in 2010 the volume of digital music sales 
on the total value of recorded music sales in the countries examined in the ELIAMEP Study was, 
respectively, 9.2 percent in Belgium, 12.6 percent in Germany, 15.3 percent in Italy and 25.2 percent in 
the United Kingdom.  Id. 
 158. See Frabboni, supra note 24, at 395 (emphasizing that the E.U. Commission was fully aware 
of the problems of economic sustainability that the adoption of a pan-European monorepertoire licensing 
model would have created for all those collecting societies deriving a large portion of their income from 
licensing foreign repertoire).  See also Commission Study of July 7, 2005, supra note 2, at 44. 
 159. See supra Section III.B. 
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prescribed by a cross-sectional clause of TFEU article 167.160 
C.  COMMERCIAL USERS AND FRAGMENTATION OF REPERTOIRES 
The biggest commercial users of digital music (i.e., those who are able to devise 
and launch pan-European services) should have been the main beneficiaries of the 
restructuring of online rights management in the European Union. However, very 
few among these users seem to be satisfied with the fragmentation of music 
repertoires stemming from the withdrawal of major publishers’ rights from the 
system of reciprocal representation.161  Major retailers of online music complained 
that fragmentation of repertoires obliges them to negotiate and enter into multiple 
licensing agreements with different entities in order to clear all those rights that, 
under the old fashioned system, they could easily obtain through a monoterritorial 
blanket license from each national collecting society.  For instance, one of the most 
popular providers of music downloads through its iTunes Music Store, Apple, and 
a large German retailer of music downloads, music videos and ringtones like 
Deutsche Telekom expressed their frustration in the context of public consultations 
held by the E.U. Commission.162  Both online music retailers emphasized that their 
licensing businesses were much smoother before the advent of the new regime and 
showed a strong preference for the previous monoterritorial global repertoire 
licenses.163 
 
 160. See TFEU, supra note 28, art. 167(4) (“The Union shall take cultural aspects into account in 
its action under other provisions of the Treaties, in particular in order to respect and to promote the 
diversity of its cultures.”).  See also Gyertyanfy, supra note 50, at 71 (criticizing the fact that word 
“culture” does not appear in the nineteen paragraphs and in the preamble of Recommendation of 
October 18, 2005). 
 161. Nokia (i.e., one of the world's largest mobile phone manufacturers and provider of innovative 
digital music services) was definitely one of the very few commercial users having publicly disclosed its 
satisfaction with the pan-European monorepertoire approach to music licensing.  In its intervention at 
the E.U. Commission Public Hearing on the Governance of Collective Rights Management in the 
European Union held in Brussels on April 23, 2010, Nokia reported it had experienced “good progress 
in reforming the earlier national-monopoly based copyright licensing regime” and it found the 2008 
CISAC decision helpful.  On that occasion, Nokia mentioned the successful example of its “Nokia 
Comes with Music” service, which gives its mobile phone users unlimited access to music downloads 
for a certain period (typically one year) at the end of which the consumer can keep everything she has 
downloaded.  For this service, Nokia entered into pan-European licensing agreements with PRS for 
Music, Chrysalis Music, Peer Music, Sony/ATV and Warner Chappell.  See Public Hearing on the 
Governance of Collective Rights Management in the EU, Brussells, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/management/management_en.htm#hearing (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2011). See also Press Release:  PRS for Music, PRS for Music, Chrusalis Music, peermusic, 
Sony/ATV, and Warner/Chappell Music support Nokia’s European Roll Out, PRS FOR MUSIC (May 14, 
2009), http://www.prsformusic.com/aboutus/press/latestpressreleases/Pages/InnovativeComesWith 
MusicserviceextendingtootherEU.aspx. 
 162. See, e.g., Deutsche Telekom Reply to the Commission’s Consultation Regarding the Online 
Distribution of Music (June 30, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/ 
2009_online_commerce/deutsche_telecom_ag.pdf [hereinafter Deutsche Telekom Reply].  See generally 
Online Commerce Roundtable Report on Opportunities and Barriers to Online Retailing (May 26, 
2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/media/online_commerce.html (reporting the 
opinions expressed by Apple in the debate on online retailing of music). 
 163. See, e.g., Deutsche Telekom Reply, supra note 162.  Deutsche Telekom writes: 
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As the new licensing scenario stands, a pan-European service provider wishing 
to offer the repertoire of the major international music publishers needs to negotiate 
with their different specialized agents and resort to the traditional management 
services of national collecting societies (or to one of their regional hubs) if it 
intends to enrich its service or platform with local music repertoires.  This 
monorepertoire licensing system evidently requires any lawful commercial user 
like Apple to identify beforehand which music titles he wants to use and which 
entity manages those titles; and this seems an almost unbearable task. 
Commercial users still have to face general legal uncertainty as to the identity of 
the collective rights managers entitled to grant licenses, and the exact scope of such 
licenses (especially in case of split copyright ownership, in which the presence of 
multiple rights holders makes it difficult to understand who controls the necessary 
rights).  In replying to the 2009 consultation of the E.U. Commission regarding 
online distribution of music, YouTube (Google) and Apple raised the issue that, 
due to repertoire fragmentation, commercial users do not know exactly which 
rights they are clearing or purchasing.164  This is due to the unfortunate 
circumstance that many collective rights organizations (still accustomed to the 
practice of granting blanket licenses giving access to global music repertoires) are 
largely unable to provide commercial users with sufficient repertoire data 
identifying the relevant rights owners in a certain song.  This is particularly 
unfortunate, YouTube stressed, for devisers of user-generated platforms, who need 
to know the repertoire data in advance in order to monetize content.165 
For now, the only specialized rights manager who can license full packages of 
rights for digital uses in Europe, due to its structure, is SGAE, acting as de facto 
exclusive manager of Sony and Peer Music’s Latin American repertoire, PEL.  The 
other specialized agents can directly license the sole mechanical shares of their 
 
Although Deutsche Telekom is generally interested in multi-territory licenses, there is no 
advantage for Deutsche Telekom if such multi-territory licenses must be acquired from a 
multitude of right-owners with regard to certain works and/or music repertoires.  The efforts to 
find out the numerous rights owners (co-lyricists, co-composers, co-publishers) for each music 
work contained in broad music repertoire offers is higher than the effort for the acquisition of 
global repertoire licenses from a limited number of collecting societies. 
Id. 
 164. See Apple/Itunes Response to the Commission’s Consultation Regarding Opportunities in 
Online Goods and Services, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/media/ 
apple_itunes_contribution.pdf; Google/YouTube Reply to the Commission’s Consultation Regarding the 
Online Distribution of Music (July 15, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/ 
2009_online_commerce/google_youtube.pdf [hereinafter Google/YouTube Reply]. 
 165. See Google/Youtube Reply, supra note 164, at 2.  Unsurprisingly, in its attempt to legalize the 
uploads of YouTube’s users in Europe, Google is still negotiating and obtaining the old fashioned 
monoterritorial licenses for the clearance of the online rights of public performance for global music 
repertoires with national collecting societies such as SACEM (France) and SIAE (Italy).  As pointed out 
in the main text, these societies still manage such rights, on the grounds of their reciprocal representation 
agreements, even for the Anglo-American repertoires of major international music groups.  See also 
Aymaric Pichevin, Youtube Signs with France’s SACEM, BILLBOARD.BIZ (Sept. 30, 2010), http:// 
www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/others/youtube-signs-with-france-s-sacem-1004117894.story; Claudio 
Tamburino, YouTube e SIAE, Licenza di Monetizzare, PUNTO INFORMATICO (July 29, 2010), http:// 
punto-informatico.it/2958158/PI/News/youtube-siae-licenza-monetizzare.aspx. 
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Anglo-American repertoire.  However, for the clearance of public performance 
shares of the same repertoire, online music providers still need to enter into 
agreements with the national collecting societies.166 
Finally, the legal uncertainty that still characterizes the licensing practices of 
specialized agents like CELAS and of national collecting societies undeniably 
stifles large investments on pan-European online platforms. 
An emblematic example of uncertainty (and deceptiveness) at the expense of a 
big commercial user was given by a E.U.-wide rights clearance solution offered by 
Dutch collecting society BUMA/STEMRA to U.S.-based online music retailer 
Beatport.167 
In July 2008, BUMA/STEMRA concluded with Beatport a E.U.-wide license 
granting access to the entire global music repertoire for online uses.  It was the very 
first time that a multirepertoire license was issued by a collecting society on a 
European scale.  This initiative triggered the almost immediate reaction of PRS and 
GEMA, which sued BUMA/STEMRA to bring the offering of this license to an 
end.  PRS succeeded in claiming firstly before the District Court of Haarlem 
(Netherlands) and then before the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam that the 
reciprocal representation agreement signed by these two organizations had given 
BUMA no right to manage the music repertoire of PRS outside the Dutch 
territory.168  GEMA obtained a similar court ruling before the Court of Manheim 
(Germany) in August 2008 in respect of the reciprocal representation agreement it 
had signed with BUMA/STEMRA.169 
In both cases the rulings enforced the territorial restrictions embodied into the 
reciprocal representation agreements signed by BUMA/STEMRA with PRS and 
GEMA and ordered the Dutch collecting society to refrain from granting or 
applying licensing agreements for the benefit of online users providing music 
services which were accessible outside the Netherlands.170  Interestingly, in the 
 
 166. Obviously, commercial users are placed in a much easier position in the rights clearance 
process whenever one of these agents (e.g., CELAS or IMPEL) sublicenses the performing rights pre-
acquired by national collecting societies and bundles them with the mechanical rights. 
 167. Guibault & van Gompel, supra note 107, at 163–65 (reporting that BUMA/STEMRA 
publicly disclosed that, under the licenselicense granted, the royalty rates were the tariffs of the 
countries where Beatport would have concretely exploited the music works, and therefore, the 
licenselicense would have been a mere implementation of the rights acquired through the system of 
reciprocal representation). 
 168. Id. (citing Rb.-Haarlem 19 augustus 2008, KG ZA 08-410, m.nt. (The Performing Rights 
Soc'y Ltd./Vereniging BUMA) (Neth.), available at http://www.boek9.nl/index.php?//Prs+vs.+Buma//// 
20609/; Hof's-Amsterdam 19 januari 2010, 01 KG, m.nt. (Verniging BUMA/The Performing Rights 
Soc'y Ltd.) (Neth.) available at http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/ 
resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=BL4289&u_ljn=BL4289. 
 169. Id. at 65 (citing Landesrechtsprechung [LRG] [higher land court] Aug. 25, 2008, 7 O 224/08 
Kart, available at http://lrbw.juris.de/cgi-bin/laender_rechtsprechung/ 
document.py?Gericht=bw&GerichtAuswahl=Landgerichte&Art=en&Datum=2008-
8&nr=11180&pos=3&anz=8). 
 170. BUMA/STEMRA advocated the legitimacy of its licenselicense for Beatport's pan-European 
services claiming that the territorial restrictions stemming from the reciprocal representation agreements 
were nonenforceable in the online environment.  BUMA argued that online services had a cross-border 
reach by definition and, as a consequence, that online rights could not have been restricted territorially 
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Dutch proceedings BUMA sought to take advantage of the E.U. Commission’s 
invalidation of the territorial delineation practices embodied in the CISAC decision, 
which was issued a few days before the grant of the challenged license.171  The 
court ruling dismissed the argument recognizing that territorial restrictions were 
still enforceable since they were not invalidated per se by the CISAC decision, but 
were rather found unlawful because of the concerted method implemented by the 
EEA collecting societies. 
D.  WHAT ROOM FOR AUTHORS’ INDIVIDUAL MANAGEMENT AND START-UPS’ 
COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT? 
Nowadays, many composers, lyricists and music performers claim the right to 
manage their online rights individually while being able to entrust (or to continue to 
entrust) their offline rights to collecting societies.  Many individual rights holders 
today find it convenient to diversify the management of their rights and to authorize 
uses of their works through more permissive rights management tools like Creative 
Commons licenses.172  The suitability to apply such more permissive (or “some 
rights reserved”) forms of licensing is also shared by recently launched companies 
like U.S.-based Magnatune and U.K. start-ups such as Beatpick and Flattr, which 
adopt new models of compensation for the creators they group and represent.173 
On both fronts the main questions is the same: is the current E.U. Commission’s 
attempt to restructure copyright collective management of any help to these 
individuals and businesses? 
As far as the position of individual authors is concerned, it is still problematic to 
assert whether a composer or a lyricist in the European Union wishing to split her 
online rights from the bundle of rights assigned to her current collecting society can 
effectively do that.  Rights holders’ freedom to assign their online rights to a 
licensing entity of their choice was one of the key principles of the 
Recommendation of October 18, 2005.  However, the recommendation was a soft 
law instrument that had no binding force and could not oblige national collecting 
societies to allow such split in the management of online and offline rights.  A 
music author certainly enjoys at the individual level the freedom to choose and 
enroll in a collecting society based in a E.U. member state different from that where 
she has her economic residence, irrespective of the member state of residence or the 
nationality of either the collecting society or the right holder.  As we have seen, the 
European Commission firstly sponsored the territorial liberalization of the 
relationship between authors and collecting societies through its nonbinding 2005 
 
(as it happens, instead, for offline rights).  The court ruling dismissed the argument holding that online 
rights could not be meant to be included in the scope of the reciprocal representation agreements, since 
the above mentioned Santiago and Barcelona agreements had expired and were not renewed.  See supra 
Section II.A.  To cover online rights, according to the court ruling, the parties (i.e., PRS for Music and 
BUMA) should have signed a new reciprocal representation agreement or amended the pre-existing one. 
 171. Guibault & van Gompel, supra note 107, at 163–64. 
 172. See CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2011). 
 173. See BEATPICK, http://beatpick.com (last visited Feb. 24, 2011); FLATTR, http://flattr.com (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2011); MAGNATUNE, http://magnatune.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2011). 
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recommendation and subsequently made it mandatory for collecting societies 
through the 2008 CISAC decision, by ordering the withdrawal of the economic 
residence clauses from their reciprocal representation agreements.174 
The possibility of splitting the management of online rights from the 
management of the other rights assigned to a collecting society, instead, has more 
complex roots.  This freedom was strongly advocated by the 2005 recommendation 
for the sole withdrawal and transfer of the multiterritorial management of online 
rights from one collecting society to another.  The Commission recommended that, 
when the management of online rights is transferred, all collecting societies should 
ensure that those online rights are withdrawn from any existing reciprocal 
representation agreement concluded among them.175 
The 2005 recommendation did not contemplate, instead, the distinct hypothesis 
of an author wishing to retain her online rights for her own individual management 
(e.g., under a Creative Commons “Attribution—Noncommercial—No Derivatives 
Works” license) while being able to assign (or to continue to assign) the remaining 
rights for offline exploitations to a collecting society.176  The E.U. Commission 
analyzed this hypothesis in an important antitrust decision in 2002, known as the 
Daft Punk decision.177  In this case the (two) members of the French band Daft 
Punk objected to the Commission that collecting society SACEM refused them 
membership because they intended to individually manage their rights for 
exploitations on the Internet and through physical formats (e.g., CDs, DVDs, etc).  
Indeed, SACEM required its authors to assign all their rights through the 
conclusion of standard administration mandates which were viewed by Daft Punk 
as an unfair commercial practice and as a possible abuse of the dominant position 
under article 102 of TFEU (former article 82 of the EC Treaty).  SACEM 
advocated its practice by holding that an all-encompassing rights management 
approach ultimately protected the authors from unreasonable demands of the 
recording industry and prevented a “cherry picking” of the most valuable rights.178 
The Commission took the view that the fairest solution to that case lay 
somewhere in the middle.  The decision found it legitimate that SACEM sought to 
retain control over certain rights that authors intended to exercise certain rights 
individually.  However, the Commission considered that refusing membership was 
a disproportionate limitation of the authors’ contractual freedom to manage the 
rights at issue.  For this reason, the decision found SACEM’s conduct contrary to 
EC Treaty article 82 and ordered the French collecting society to grant derogations 
to the rule of the all-encompassing character of rights assignment on a case by case 
basis on objective and reasonable grounds.  In response to this decision, SACEM 
 
 174. See supra Sections II.A and II.C. 
 175. See Recommendation of Oct. 18, 2005, supra note 21, at 56. 
 176. Creative Commons—Attribution-NonCommercial-NonDerivative LicenseLicense 3.0 
Unported, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 (last visited Feb. 24, 
2011). 
 177. See Case 37219, Banghalter v. SACEM, 2002 Eur. Comm'n Competition, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/37219/37219_11_3.pdf. 
 178. Guibault & van Gompel, supra note 107, at 141. 
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amended its by-laws and now allows its members to apply for a limited withdrawal 
of the rights assigned. 
Several collecting societies in Europe did something similar, especially in the 
wake of the 2005 recommendation, even if they were not legally bound by this 
instrument and the recommendation did not make any reference to the freedom of 
individual management for the specific case of online rights.  The Commission’s 
position expressed in the Daft Punk case is, therefore, still the benchmark. 
On the grounds of the Daft Punk precedent and embracing the philosophy of the 
recommendation, an increasing number of collecting societies in the European 
Union are exploring the possibility of allowing their members to adopt Creative 
Commons licenses for their online noncommercial uses of their works while 
making such licensing compatible with the management of commercial uses by the 
same societies.  Such a “dual licensing” policy has already been embraced by 
collecting societies KODA (Denmark) and BUMA/STEMRA (Netherlands), 
whereas SIAE (Italy) established a working group to study various licensing 
solutions for a consistent and constructive coexistence.179 
As far as new or potential providers of collective rights management services are 
concerned, we know that in the last years the E.U. Commission sought to remove 
those legal barriers that restricted rights holders and collective rights managers 
from choosing freely their territorial ambit of operation and their most suitable 
business partners within the E.U. territory. 
This policy design has inevitably collided with the heavy barriers and 
discrepancies that exist at the national level as a consequence of the absence of a 
common regulatory framework (a “common playing field” in the E.U. internal 
market parlance) that all stakeholders could rely upon.180  Neither the soft law of 
the 2005 recommendation nor the ad hoc 2008 CISAC antitrust decision could 
effectively persuade or oblige, say, Germany to change its strict supervision 
approach in the regulation of collective management or other continental European 
countries (Italy, for instance) to open this activity to free market and to dismantle 
well established legal or de facto monopolies. 
Consequently, the possibility for a new company wishing to pursue or to 
experiment with alternative business models and to enter (implementing one of 
these models) the territorially unrestricted market of online copyright management 
services largely depends on the openness and flexibility of the regulatory 
framework of its country of incorporation.  That is why both the aforementioned 
European start-ups were incorporated in the United Kingdom, in spite of their 
Italian (Beatpick) and Swedish (Flattr) origins and conceptions.181 
 
 179. See  Alberto Grandi, SIAE, Apertura verso i Creative Commons, WIRED MAG (Oct. 14, 2010),  
http://mag.wired.it/news/siae-apertura-verso-i-creative-commons.html; More Opportunities to Promote 
Their Own Repertoire, BUMA/STEMRA, http://www.bumastemra.nl/nl-NL/Pers/Persberichten/ 
pilotCC.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2011); Michelle Thorne, Danish Collecting Society KODA Teams up 
with CC Denmark, CREATIVE COMMONS (Jan. 31, 2008), https://creativecommons.org/ 
weblog/entry/8012.. 
 180. See infra Section VII.B. 
 181. Gianluigi De Stefano, Il Suono dell’Avvenire, DOC STOC, http://www.docstoc.com/docs/ 
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Strange as it may seem then, unconventional forms of individual and collective 
online music rights management are currently benefiting, to a certain extent, from 
the E.U. Commission’s reform. 
VII.  FUTURE PROSPECTS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The scenarios depicted above show an undeniable situation of chaos, from both 
a legal and a market related perspective.  An unbearable degree of uncertainty still 
characterizes crucial components of the new rights management architecture for 
digital music.  As this Article suggests, the major multinational music groups 
should have been the greatest beneficiaries of the radical changes advocated by the 
E.U. Commission.  However, these actors are still facing insurmountable problems 
while seeking to centralize their E.U.-wide online rights management and to 
eventually acquire or clear all copyrights and related rights which are needed to 
establish workable one-stop shops for actual and prospective pan-European online 
music services. 
In my view, such uncertainty is not coincidental.  Rather, it is a consequence of 
the inaccurate and partisan way through which the E.U. Commission proceeded in 
a politically and culturally sensitive area of copyright law through the enactment of 
its 2005 recommendation.  A radical change of the structure of online collective 
rights management was sought without intending to pursue any legislative 
harmonization of the disparate regulatory frameworks governing the establishment 
and activities of collective rights management organizations at the national level.  
Moreover, the Commission has not taken into consideration that copyright contract 
laws and practices vary significantly from country to country and lead to distinct 
relationships between authors and music publishers and distinct copyright 
ownership regimes.182  In particular, the fact that continental European collecting 
societies followed a union model in protecting authors from the bargaining power 
of music publishers and in ensuring that authors eventually kept the copyright in 
their works was largely disregarded. 
Regrettably, as we have seen, the adoption in the online music sector of 
monorepertoire licensing models has not been endorsed by the European 
Parliament, even though these models penalize small or medium sized collecting 
societies and their commercially weaker repertoires. While opting for a market 
driven solution in a rather solitary enterprise, the E.U. Commission has avoided a 
truly democratic debate about what the nature, type of governance, functions and 
ultimate objectives of music rights management organizations should be in the 
future, namely, in the so called “information society.” 
 
46120961/Article-on-il-Sole-24-Ore-Italian-biggest-financial-newspaper-on-Beatpickcom (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2011); The Flattr Story, FLATTR, http://flattr.com/about (last visited Feb. 24, 2011). 
 182. See Rita Matulionytė, Cross Border Collective Management and Principle of Territoriality:  
Problems and Possible Solutions in the EU, 11 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 467, 470 (2009) (pointing out 
that important copyright issues such as initial ownership regimes, especially in cases of work for hire, 
and the definitions of joint work have not been harmonized under E.U. law and cause problems for 
efficient cross-border collective management of copyright). 
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I firmly believe that the establishment of a common playing field for copyright 
collective management though a proper legislative harmonization initiative is 
indispensable (long as this initiative may take).183 
If European collecting societies and other licensing bodies are expected to 
compete wth one another on reasonably fair grounds, they should enjoy a uniform 
legal treatment and be subject to similar administrative duties and burdens (e.g., the 
pursuit of solidarity or cultural goals), which can greatly influence their 
profitability.184 
What is also indispensable, in my view, is a conscious and democratic decision 
about what the advocated competitive relationship between collecting societies 
should be about.  In other words, should such competition be based on the strengths 
of management services or—as the E.U. Commission claims today—on the appeal 
of music repertoires, regardless of how big or commercially valuable they are at the 
moment? 
This seems to me a politically and culturally strategic choice, which should be 
made carefully and democratically.  As things stand in the offline world, music 
repertoires have very different commercial values and the disproportion between 
the market power and the territorial penetration of the Anglo-American repertoire 
and of national repertoires is impressive in Europe.  One wonders why E.U. law 
and policy makers should deliberately facilitate the sole position and rights 
management model of the music multinational industry, which has been largely 
incapable of adapting its businesses to the online music world in the last ten years.  
Why should not Europe give all repertoires the chance to be heard and known 
online, taking its cultural diversity as an advantage and investing on the potential of 
new technologies for the valorization and wide diffusion of a vast array of music 
works, and not only the “chart hits” that the Commission seems to exclusively care 
about? 
 
 183. Surprisingly, this is the same view expressed by GEMA at the E.U. Commission’s Public 
Hearing on the Governance of Collective Rights Management in the EU, held in Brussels on April 23, 
2010.  On that occasion, GEMA advocated an urgent legislative initiative of the Commission aimed at 
enacting a directive on collective rights management.  The speech delivered in Brussels by the managing 
director of GEMA’s Department of Broadcasting and Online was very critical of the monorepertoire 
model that the E.U. Commission has endorsed so far (and that GEMA, through its CELAS and 
PAECOL subsidiaries, seemed to benefit from).  The GEMA representative said: 
Who still proposes to introduce competition between collecting societies about licensing deals 
(and secretly hopes to cut his costs) merely repeats the arguments of yesterday.  Whereas the 
discussion of today is about win-win solutions for all involved stakeholders. . . . During the last 
ten years we have learned that competition law alone does not provide for solutions. . . .  We 
need a horizontal framework directive that covers all of the activities of collecting societies. 
Urban Pappi, Relationship Between Collective Rights Managers and Commercial Users Intervention at 
the Public Hearing on the Governance of Collective Rights Management in the EU (April 23, 2010), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/hearing20100423/ 
panel_3_gema_en.pdf. 
 184. See Guibault & Van Gompel, supra note 40, at 138–40.  See also Matulionytė, supra note 
182, at 479–80 (suggesting the adoption of a directive on collective rights management and discussing, 
in particular, issues that would be worth harmonizing at the E.U. level, e.g. the so-called establishment 
requirement, deductions for cultural and social purposes, etc.). 
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It was emphasized above that E.U. law and policy makers are constitutionally 
bound to take cultural diversity into account, and to promote such diversity in their 
action.  In this regard, lawmakers should preferably opt for a licensing model that 
proves to work smoothly on a pan-European scale and does not end up 
discriminating and fragmenting commercial users’ and consumers’ legitimate 
access to music repertoires. 
In this alternative scenario, in my view, collecting societies should compete one 
with the other on the sole grounds of their management services without 
discriminating between different categories of rights holders. 
The European Union has already adopted multiterritorial or “central” licensing 
solutions which presuppose a single act of rights clearance by commercial users 
and have an immediate pan-European reach.  The legislative adoption of one of 
these models for the creation of one stop shops in the management of online music 
rights is the least disruptive and most practical alternative to the currently 
unrealistic goal of unification of the national copyright systems and to the 
consequent creation of single E.U. entitlements, which would automatically 
supersede national rights. 
This licensing solution for pan-European licensing of copyrighted works already 
exists under E.U. law and was implemented under the 1993 Satellite and Cable 
Directive and, more recently, under the 2010 Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive.185  Both directives apply, respectively, a principle of private international 
law known as “country of origin” to broadcast transmission signals and to online 
transmissions of audiovisual content (mainly digital TV services).186  In both cases, 
the logic is that of avoiding the cumulative application of several national laws to a 
single E.U.-wide act of commercial exploitation of a copyrighted work, by 
adopting a criterion that identifies a single applicable law.187  Even though their 
logic is the same, these two directives implement the principle of the law of the 
country of origin of the transmission in different ways. 
Directive 93/83 adopts a country of emission rule, under which satellite 
broadcasters must clear copyrights just once, in the E.U. member state from which 
the programme-carrying signal is uplinked to the satellite under the control and 
responsibility of the broadcaster (rather than in the various member states where the 
 
 185. Council Directive 93/83/ECC, art. 1.2, 1993 O.J. (L 248) 15, 19 (EC) [hereinafter Directive 
93/83]; Directive 2010/13, art. 2, 2010 O.J. (L 95), 1 (EU) (codified version) [hereinafter Directive 
2010/13], replacing (with no substantive changes) Directive 2007/65, art. 2, 2007 O.J. (L 332), 27 (EC) 
[hereinafter Directive 2007/65]. 
 186. See Creative Content, supra note 3, at 12, 17 (discussing the possible legislative extension of 
the principle of the country of origin of the transmission principle to the realm of online film deliveries).  
See also Hannah Wardale, The New Frontier—The Audiovisual Media Services Directive, 31 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 336, 338 (2009) (providing an overview of Directive 2007/65). 
 187. See Matulionytė, supra note 182, at 475–78 (discussing the above mentioned “single law 
approach” with regard to the applicability of Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC) (E-Commerce 
Directive), and Directive 2006/123, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 36 (EC) (Services Directive) to services of 
collective rights management).  As this author concludes, both these directives, which enable service 
providers to adhere to the single law of their country of establishment, explicitly exclude copyrights and 
neighboring rights from their field of application and can hardly be applied to the establishment and 
functioning of collecting societies. Id. 
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broadcast is received because of the satellite footprint).  By contrast, Directive 
2010/13 (which codified the 2007 “modernization” amendment to the 1989 
Television without Frontiers Directive) extends a “country of establishment” rule 
from traditional television services to both interactive and noninteractive online 
television services.  Due to the country of establishment principle, providers of 
audiovisual media services must comply only with the laws (including copyright 
law) of the E.U. member state where the service provider is established, rather than 
with those of the member states where the service can be received.188 
While adopting a “single law approach,” both these directives took steps to 
prevent opportunistic location of the television service’s business establishment or 
of the point of departure of the transmission in a country with particularly lax 
copyright norms.  First, the single law approach applied only to business 
establishments or transmission points located within the European Union.  Second, 
the Directives embodied measures ensuring a sufficient level of substantive 
harmonization of member state laws in their respective fields of application.  This 
means that, despite the application of a single national law with E.U.-wide effects 
on satellite and online TV services, identical or similar conditions for market 
players in all E.U. member states preclude a “race to the bottom.” 
If E.U. law elaborated and then extended the country of origin principle to all 
kinds of online music services operated within the European Union, then a 
multirepertoire license acquired in the territory of the country of the 
communication’s origin would automatically cover the whole E.U. territory.  For a 
matter of consistency, this principle should be extended also to the licensing of 
rights in sound recordings, in such a way that a license obtained from rights holders 
in sound recordings (or from their collecting societies) would automatically have a 
pan-European reach. 
It goes without saying that E.U. lawmakers would need to determine how to 
concretely adapt the country of origin principle to the realm of online music 
services.  The criterion identifying the single applicable law could be either the 
country of upload of the copyrighted content to the server connected to the Internet 
or the country of establishment of the service provider.  These variations on the 
country of origin principle would entail the emergence of distinct scenarios, whose 
thorough analysis goes beyond the purposes of this Article.189 
What matters here, in my view, is that the above mentioned risk of a “race to the 
bottom” in the protection of rights holders—as a consequence of the application of 
one single national law—would be widely mitigated by the circumstance that 
member state copyright rules have already been harmonized to a sufficient extent.  
 
 188. Directive 2010/13, supra note 185, art. 2, ¶ 3 (establishing the criteria according to which a 
media service provider should be deemed to be established in a given member state:  e.g., location of the 
provider’s head office or location of a significant part of its workforce). 
 189. For instance, E.U. law would need to establish a secondary criterion identifying the single law 
of a E.U. member state if the service provider establishment or the transmission points were not located 
within the European Union (e.g., opting for the law of the member state with which the online music 
service or the non-E.U. provider are most closely connected, in light of, say, the presence of offices or 
workforce of the same provider). 
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As this Article has suggested, an even stronger level of harmonization would stem 
from the creation of a common playing field for collecting societies through the 
adoption of a directive on collective rights management law. 
The pan-European reach of the multi-repertoire license in the country of origin 
would derive automatically from the law of such country since, legally speaking, 
that country would be the only place of use of copyrighted works in the online 
environment.190  Under this approach, collecting societies should continue to be 
bound by the principle of nondiscrimination between different categories of rights 
holders and repertoires and should continue to rely on reciprocal representation 
agreements in order to give commercial users access to the global music repertoire. 
In this prospective framework, all stakeholders would effectively end up treating 
the European Union as a “Digital Single Market.”  The opportunity for online 
music providers to offer their services by merely having to clear the necessary 
online rights in the country where their content is materially uploaded  (or where 
the provider is established), while paying the same price for all music titles, would 
greatly reduce today’s discriminations between big and small music repertoires, 
mainstream and local (or niche) repertoires, major recording businesses and small 
or independent record labels, traditional business models and innovative businesses 
combining commercial and noncommercial licenses.  On the rights holders’ front, 
their freedom to select and join a collecting society of their choice for the 
management of online music rights in the European Union then would ensure that 
societies would effectively compete and seek to implement the best management 
conditions for their members (i.e., both authors and publishers). As for the 
economic conditions of licensing, fair competition among collecting societies on 
license prices would be ensured through the inclusion in the above mentioned 
regulatory framework on collective rights management law of a principle obliging 
societies and commercial users to take account of the actual and potential audience 
of the online content transmission on a pan-European basis in determining the 
amounts of the payments to be made for the rights acquired.191 
From a practical perspective, the effects of such a centralized, truly pan-
European licensing system would be similar to those of the above mentioned 
Santiago and Barcelona agreements, the IFPI Simulcasting Agreement and the type 
 
 190. It goes beyond the scope and the purposes of this Article to discuss the implications of the 
proposed reform for the determination of the law applicable to copyright infringements affecting works 
made available online under the above mentioned “single law” principle.  This aspect is currently 
disciplined under Regulation 864/2007, art. 8, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:199:0040:0049:EN:PDF.  Regulation 
864/2007, article 8, provides that the law applicable to a noncontractual obligation arising from the an 
infringement of an intellectual property right should be the law of the country for which protection is 
claimed (lex loci protectionis).  Ideally, to avoid the application of distinct laws to the management of 
online music rights and the infringement of the same rights, E.U. lawmakers could create an exception 
to the lex loci protectionis rule by embracing the principle of the country of origin of the transmission 
even for the determination of the law applicable to online copyright infringements. 
 191. Directive 93/83, supra note 185, recital 17 (containing a similar principle requiring satellite 
broadcasters and collective rights organizations to take account of all aspects of the broadcast, such as 
the actual and the potential audience and the language version, in the determination of the license price). 
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of E.U.-wide multirepertoire license granted by BUMA/STEMRA to Beatport in 
2008.192  From a legal perspective, however, the implementation of the law of the 
country of the transmission’s origin in the whole E.U. territory would avoid the 
recourse to antitrust reviews of contractual territorial restrictions and make the 
online integration of the E.U. market happen by mere operation of the law. 
As this Article has shown, the results of the 2008 CISAC decision have been 
modest so far and today’s persistence of the structural problems of copyright 
transfer and management at the national level, in spite of the legally binding force 
of the decision, show that the implementation of E.U. competition law in this area 
cannot have, as such, constructive consequences.  As we have seen, by forcing 
collecting societies to conclude independently and secretly negotiated agreements 
for their reciprocal representation on a territorial basis, the Commission’s decision 
dramatically reduced the degree of transparency of the E.U. market for collective 
management services, treating collecting societies as if they were ordinary 
businesses. 
Therefore, with regard to the territorial dimension of the licensing system at 
issue, the E.U.-wide character of online music licenses would be mandated by law 
in order to avoid artificial restrictions in an intrinsically borderless environment.  
To a certain extent, the mandatory pan-European dimension of online music 
licenses in the intangible world of copyright would play for diffusion of online 
music service (and, possibly, for the diffusion of other kind of online content) the 
same market-integrating function that the exhaustion principle plays at the E.U. 
level in the real (i.e., tangible) world for the free circulation of physical items 
embodying copyrighted works in the E.U. territory.  To this end, the proposed 
licensing system would sacrifice the music rights holders’ freedom to license their 
rights on a strictly monoterritorial basis and to geolocalize the legitimate online 
transmission of their works, recordings or performances, in the same way as E.U. 
copyright law restricts the national subject matter of the right of distribution when 
the copyrighted tangible good is placed on the market with the copyright owner’s 
consent.193 
From an economic and cultural perspective, the advocated reform would greatly 
emphasize the function of reciprocal representation agreements, through which 
each collecting society builds up its multirepertoire of “musical offering” while 
giving national collective rights managers (even the small and medium size ones) a 
large incentive to compete with one another on the grounds of the quality, speed 
and innovative character of their services.  As the Article has suggested, innovation 
in this field may also be given by the development of “dual licensing” policies 
which could facilitate the coexistence of commercial licenses issued by collecting 
societies and noncommercial licenses individually granted by rights holders for 
 
 192. See supra note 40 (recalling the E.U.-wide effects of the Simulcasting Agreement for the 
licensing of record producers’ rights of simulcasting).  See also Major Step Forward in Cross Border 
Music Licensing Regime, IFPI (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.ifpi.org/content/section_news/ 
20070427.html (informing about the extension of reciprocal representation agreements among record 
producers’ collecting societies to web-casting and on-demand services). 
 193. See Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 1, art. 4.2. 
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promotional online uses (e.g., on YouTube, social networks, personal Web pages, 
etc.).  It seems evident to me that such an easier and clearer structure of online 
music rights licensing would ultimately promote European cultural diversity.  A 
wide and legitimate exploitation of highly diversified stocks of music repertoires 
would be strongly encouraged; small and independent entrepreneurs, who are 
completely forgotten and discriminated against in today’s licensing system, would 
be given a much greater incentive to invest in online content services and an 
effective enjoyment of music “without frontiers” (i.e., on a truly European basis) 
would become feasible through reasonably cheap and equal forms of access to 
cultural content by the widest portion of E.U. citizens. 
Finally, as far as the definition of the rights covering online exploitations, it 
seems clear that today’s archaic distinction between mechanical and public 
performance rights is no longer justified, neither legally nor economically.  It does 
make sense to keep, for instance, the licensing of streaming music services distinct 
from that of music downloads, but this should only be an economically relevant 
distinction, allowing rights holders to price discriminate between licensing 
solutions corresponding to differentiated forms of exploitation (e.g., randomized 
Web radio streams like the service Pandora; music downloads from sources such as 
iTunes and Beatport; ringtones and Nokia’s mobile phone downloads).  Legally 
speaking, however, keeping the distinction into force in the online environment has 
proven to be highly detrimental for the development of a mature market for online 
creative content.  In my view, online rights management should no longer be based 
on old fashioned categories of rights which were exercised distinctly and 
transferred to today’s rights holders when composers, lyricists and music publishers 
(e.g., John Lennon, Paul McCartney and EMI in the 1960s) could not imagine what 
the online world and the related forms of commercial exploitations would have 
been about.  As we have seen, the simultaneous implementation of both these old 
fashioned categories in online rights clearance processes has entailed in Europe the 
risks described by the “tragedy of the anticommons.”194 
I agree with those authors who have called for a radical change in online 
licensing practices and proposed the worldwide recognition of a new exclusive 
right of authorization functioning as a single digital transmission right covering all 
kinds of online and mobile exploitations.195  I believe that the existence of a very 
wide statutory right of making copyrighted content available to the public under 
article 3.2 of Council Directive 2001/29 should place the European Union in a 
position to enforce such a right in conformity with the objective that the directive 
intended to pursue.  The making available right was the first E.U. right formulated 
while having online services in mind and such right was specifically tailored to 
 
 194. In the copyright field, the risk of such a situation is entailed by multiple layers of exclusive 
rights over the same music works and over the same sound recording.  See Michael A. Heller, The 
Tragedy of the Anticommons:  Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
621, 623 (1998) (coining this expression to describe a coordination breakdown caused by the existence 
of too many owners over the same resource). 
 195. See Gyertyanfy, supra note 50, at 88; Bennet Lincoff, Common Sense, Accommodation and 
Sound Policy for the Digital Music Marketplace, 2 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 1, 9 (2008). 
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cover not just streaming services but also permanent downloads.196  This new 
prerogative was not conceived as a new type or category of right, but rather as an 
extension of the pre-existing right of public performance.  Unfortunately, the 
wording of the 2001 directive did not make it clear whether or not the sole 
clearance of the right of making content available would have sufficed in order to 
make online on-demand transmissions legitimate.  As we have seen, the 
simultaneous application of  the rights of digital reproduction has been deemed to 
be necessary for a legitimate offer of online music services, with an inevitable 
increase of transaction costs. 
In my view, the E.U. Commission should take action urgently in order to 
remove such uncertainty and to impose an economically viable and modern 
interpretation of the exclusive making available right.  Ideally, this right should be 
the only one covering online on-demand transmissions and, as a result, the only 
type of right to be cleared by service providers for online music deliveries, 
irrespectively of the techniques (e.g., streaming, downloading, etc.) through which 
the content is transmitted and placed at the consumer’s disposal.  Beyond efficiency 
and transparency, there are strong legal arguments under Council Directive 2001/29 
which suggest the nonenforceability of mechanical (i.e., reproduction) rights and 
the mere application of the public performance (or making available) rights in the 
realm of online music services.  It should be considered that all acts of digital 
reproductions which are technically inherent to, and economically inseparable 
from, acts of making content available to the public can be legally intended to be 
“absorbed” by the function of transmitting copyrighted works interactively, which 
is logically and economically predominant.  This rationale is clearly embodied into 
the wording of the only copyright exception that Council Directive 2001/29 made it 
mandatory for E.U. member states.197  This means that acts of reproduction which 
constitute a technical necessity, and are inherent to, acts of online content 
transmissions could be easily deemed to fall outside the scope of the right of digital 
reproduction since they have, as such, no independent economic significance. 
It remains to be seen how the objective of enforcing a single exclusive right of 
online transmission for online music services can be concretely achieved. If the 
Commission resorted to the above mentioned interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of Council Directive 2001/29, there would be no need for a legislative 
amendment of the current legal framework.  However, to do so, the Commission 
would need to change its current approach and to develop a completely new 
 
 196. Recital 23 of Council Directive 2001/29 made it clear that “this right should be understood in 
a broad sense covering all communication to the public not present at the place where the 
communication originates. This right should cover any such transmission or retransmission of a work to 
the public by wire or wireless means, including broadcasting.”  Id. 
 197. See Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 1, art. 5.  Article 5 provides: 
Temporary acts of reproduction . . . which are transient or incidental [and] an integral and 
essential part of a technological process and whose sole purpose is to enable . . . a lawful use . . . 
of a work or other subject-matter to be made, and which have no independent economic 
significance, shall be exempted from the reproduction right provided for in Article 2. 
Id.  (emphasis added). 
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strategy for the definition and management of online rights.  More realistically, the 
same objective could be achieved through a legislative reform aimed at recognizing 
the autonomous character of the right of making content available for the clearance 
of online transmissions. 
 
